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Unfulfilled Promise:
The Human Rights Class Action
Beth Van Schaackt

Historically, international law consisted primarily of substantive norms, leaving it to individual nation states to determine
how to implement and enforce those norms.! Human rights class
actions in U.S. courts represent one such fusion of international
legal rights with domestic judicial remedies.2 Since the late
1980s, victims of human rights violations have increasingly utilized Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23"), which governs the certification and conduct of the class action in federal
court.3 In certain respects, the rule embodies a unique feature of
United States procedural law.4 The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that class relief is "peculiarly appropriate" in
cases in which the "issues involved are common to the class as a
whole" and "turn on questions of law applicable in the same
manner to each member of the class."5 Because human rights
abuses are often committed on a widespread and systematic baAssistant Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law. The author is
indebted to William Aceves, Paul Hoffman, Richard Nagareda, Susana SiCouto, David
Sloss, and Beth Stephens for their helpful comments in connection with this project.
Tachiona v Mugabe, 234 F Supp 2d 401, 409 (S D NY 2002) ("International law
ordinarily leaves it to each sovereign state to devise whatever specific remedies may be
necessary to give effect to universally recognized standards."); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of
FerdinandMarcos, 20 Yale J Intl L 65, 76 (1995) ("International law does not generally
prescribe the domestic means of its own enforcement. . . ."); The Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991, 102 S Rep 249, 102d Cong, 1" Sess. (1991) *5 ("Sen Rep") ("States have the
option, under international law, to decide whether they will allow a private right of action
in their courts for violations of human rights that take place abroad.").
2 For a discussion of this notion see Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law
Litigation, 100 Yale L J 2347 (1991) (describing merger in domestic courts of national
procedural law with substantive international law and creation of a transnational body of
law).
Indeed, the human rights class action has been heralded as a "new trend of 'mass
tort' transnational litigation." Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S.
Courts: EnforcingHuman Rights at the Corporate Level, 1999 BYU L Rev 1139, 1140.
' For a comparative discussion of class and other collective actions in civil law and
other common law jurisdictions, see the symposium edition of 11 Duke J Comp & Intl L
(2001).
' Califano v Yamasaki, 442 US 682, 701 (1979).
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sis, and because many international law norms prohibit collective
harms (for example harms directed against a group qua group),
the class action device appears, at first glance, to provide a good
fit for human rights litigation.6 And yet, measuring the success of
human rights class actions by the number of cases that have
achieved certification or proceeded to an enforceable class judgment, or by the satisfaction of victim classes with the process or
the results of their efforts, suggests that a number of challenges
exist to employing this procedural mechanism in the context of
human rights litigation.
This Article does not take the positions, advanced elsewhere,
that class actions must (or even should) replace the individual
human rights action or that human rights class actions are inherently unsound.7 It does attempt to navigate a course between
unalloyed idealism and critique to a position that accepts that the
class action device-notwithstanding its potential for abuse and
the challenges to its application-may provide an appropriate
litigation device for human rights litigants in certain circumstances.
This Article begins with a brief survey of "human rights class
actions" with an emphasis on the certification phases of the
cases.8 It then analyzes these cases within the context of several
' See M. 0. Chibundu, Making Customary International Law Through Municipal
Adjudication:A StructuralInquiry, 39 Va J Intl L 1069, 1105 (1999):

At first blush, [the class action] seems remarkably adapted to the objectives of promoting international human rights through adjudication. Fostering human rights, after all, is effective only when the restraint is applied to wrongful conduct of general application, and the class action device is a potent weapon for aggregating the interests of the victims, and
bringing the consequences of the wrong to bear forcefully on the wrongdoer.
Compare Margaret G. Perl, Note, Not Just Another Mass Tort: Using Class Actions
to Redress International Human Rights Violations, 88 Georgetown L J 773, 788 (2000)

(arguing that ATCA and TVPA class actions, not individual plaintiff actions, should be the
favored method of adjudication) and Boyd, 1999 BYU L Rev at 1201-12 (cited in note 3)
(detailing reasons why human rights litigation should proceed as class actions), with
Richard 0. Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation? The Use and Abuse of ClassActions
in International Dispute Resolution, 10 MSU-DCL J Intl L 205 (2001) (characterizing

international class actions as judicial blackmail" that force companies to settle); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Collective Harms Under the Alien Tort Statute: A CautionaryNote on

Class Actions, 6 ILSA J Intl & Comp L 567 (2000) (questioning whether class action instruments are well suited to redressing human rights violations); and Chibundu, 39 Va J
Intl L at 1105-1110 (cited in note 6) (questioning propriety of class actions on grounds of
the nature of the interests at stake, issues of representation, and the relief available).
' By "human rights class actions," this Article considers class action lawsuits involving conduct that has occurred abroad and seeking to (1) enforce international human
rights norms as set forth in either in customary international law or multilateral human
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long-running debates about the operation and propriety of class
action, by identifying some of the particular advantages and challenges posed by the class action mechanism to human rights litigation. The Article concludes that the class action device is especially well-suited for cases involving the doctrine of command responsibility (for abuses committed by subordinates) or abuses
involving a corporate course of conduct or collective harms. However, the Article cautions that, while proceeding as a class action
can provide an important vehicle for enforcing human rights
norms on behalf of an affected population, it is imperative that
class counsel be committed to providing victims with a meaningful experience through litigation and to promoting the principle of
human dignity that underlies the human rights edifice.
With these concerns in mind, this Article provides an interpretive framework for pursuing and managing human rights
class actions within Rule 23's provisions and established certification doctrines. This framework accepts that courts should construe Rule 23's requirements in light of the unique characteristics
of human rights claims and claimants, the clear congressional
policy-as expressed by the Torture Victim Protection Act
("TVPA") and amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act ("FSIA)-in favor of U.S. courts adjudicating alleged violations of human rights that occur abroad, and the courts' capacity
to adopt procedural innovations as a form of federal common law
for violations cognizable under these statutes. In application, this
will require class counsel to carefully manage relations with absentee class members in order to ensure a meaningful experience
for class members. It may also require courts to adopt both more
liberal and more stringent approaches to certain components of
Rule 23. Although this framework cannot address all of the chalrights instruments (such as the Convention Against Torture, the Genocide Convention,
and the Geneva Conventions) or (2) redress international law violations through domestic
claims or legal remedies, such as conversion and unjust enrichment. Collectively, these
cases represent a form of civil universal jurisdiction, because they involve the adjudication
of allegations of grave human rights violations that occurred abroad in cases in which the
victim or perpetrator may have no prior relationship with the United States. This Article
will not canvass civil rights class actions involving domestic abuses that may also be characterized as "human rights violations" or collective actions brought under domestic statutes specifically authorizing such actions, although some of this Article's reasoning and
conclusions may be applicable to these classes of litigation as well. See, for example, Doe v
Advanced Textile Corp, 214 F3d 1058 (9th Cir 2000) (allowing a class to proceed anonymously in a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action regarding working conditions on
Saipan island); Haitian Centers Council,Inc v Sale, 823 F Supp 1028, 1039 (E D NY 1993)

(certifying a class of Haitian refugees seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from U.S.
government action).
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lenges that may arise in human rights class actions, it does attempt to address certain procedural obstacles and structural dilemmas that have appeared in the past and that are likely to appear in future cases. It is hoped that these modest recommendations will better enable individuals engaged in human rights litigation-as counsel, litigants, and judges-to capitalize upon the
potential of the class action model to enforce universal human
rights norms.
I. SURVEY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CLASS ACTIONS

The human rights class actions adjudicated thus far have
involved a wide range of international law claims and theories of
responsibility. These cases can be grouped into three general
categories: (1) cases against individuals under the doctrine of
command responsibility; (2) cases against corporate entities alleging involvement in present day human rights violations; and (3)
cases arising out of the World War II ("WWII") period.
The first two classes of cases are generally filed under the
Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA")5 and/or the TVPA, " which extend
federal jurisdiction to violations of the law of nations.1 These
types of cases trace their roots to the historic ruling in Filartigav
Pefia-Irala,2 which first recognized the potential of the two hun-

' Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 1350 (2000). Some of the WWII cases were also
predicated in part on the ATCA. See, for example, Bodner v Banque Paribas,114 F Supp
2d 117, 127 (E D NY 2000) (asserting jurisdiction under ATCA); Iwanowa v Ford Motor
Co, 67 F Supp 2d 424, 438 (D NJ 1999).
"oTorture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-256, 106 Stat 73 (1992), codified at 28 USC § 1350.
" This Article will focus on federal class action procedure, but its observations may be
relevant to the few human rights class actions that have been filed under state law. See,
for example, Taiheiyo Cement Corp v Superior Court, 105 Cal App 4th 398, 406-07 (2003)

(finding that public policy mandates judicial consideration of slave and forced labor allegations); Alomang v Freeport-McMoRan, Inc, 811 So2d 98, 101 (La App 2002) (affirming
dismissal for failure to state a claim sufficient to support plaintiffs' alter ego allegations);
Alomang v Freeport-McMoRan, Inc, 718 So2d 971, 972-73 (La App 1998) (reversing dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction of class action filed on behalf of similarly
situated victims of summary execution, torture, and other human rights violations allegedly committed in connection with defendants' mining operations in Indonesia). Parallel
lawsuits are often filed in state and federal court. See, for example, In re World War II Era
JapaneseForcedLabor Litigation, 114 F Supp 2d 939, 942 (N D Cal 2000) (denying plaintiffs' motion for remand on grounds that the case raised substantial questions of federal
foreign relations law); Jeong v Onoda Cement Co, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 7985, *717 (C D
Cal) (remanding case because of lack of diversity and because claims were based on state
law); Sequihua v Texaco, Inc, 847 F Supp 61, 63 (S D Tex 1994) (denying plaintiffs' motion
for remand to state court because federal question jurisdiction was present).
" 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
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dred-year-old ATCA to enforce international human rights
norms.13 Because most future human rights class actions fall
within this tradition, the majority of this Article's analysis focuses on these cases.14
This Article does include a discussion of WWII historical justice cases as well-primarily because of what they teach about
the management of, and issues of representation in, class actions.
However, those cases, in many respects, are sui generis and thus
provide limited applicability outside of their unique historical
circumstances.' 5 Substantively, many of these WWII cases involved only domestic contract and tort claims for relief. More importantly, all invoked a complex interplay of law, politics, moral
suasion, media attention, and diplomacy not easily reproduced in
other contexts. Finally, these cases terminated in settlement or
dismissal at early stages of the litigation. As a result, published
opinions paid limited attention to class action mechanics, except
with regard to the certification of settlement classes and, in some
cases, the implementation of notice schemes.
Setting aside the historical justice cases, which proliferated
during the 1990s, the number of human rights class actions is
small but growing as the result of an increasing number of recent
cases filed against corporate defendants.

13 Id at 880, 887.
14 A handful of class

actions have been filed under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity

Act. See, for example, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, 2003 US Dist

LEXIS 3981, *3-4 (S D NY) (ordering corporation and Republic of Sudan to brief question
of whether Sudan is entitled to sovereign immunity under FSIA); Nemariam v Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Memorandum and Order, Civ Action No 00-CV-1392TPJ (D DC Aug 2, 2001) (on file with U Chi Legal F), revd, 315 F3d 390, 391 (D C Cir
2003) (reinstating case dismissed for forum non conveniens on the ground that claims
commission set up by the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea does not provide an adequate alternative forum); Hirsh v State of Israel, 962 F Supp 377, 385 (S D NY 1997) (dismissing putative class action where allegations did not invoke exception to sovereign
immunity).
15 Recently, several class actions in the tradition of the WWII class actions have been
filed seeking reparations for African American slave labor during the antebellum period.
See, for example, Farmer-Paellmannv FleetBoston FinancialCorp, Complaint and Jury

Trial Demand, available online at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/slavery/
fpllmnflt032602cmp.pdf (visited September 23, 2003).
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A. Command Responsibility Cases
Two ATCA/TVPA class actions have proceeded under the
doctrine of command responsibility 6 against top leaders of repressive regimes. 7 The first ATCA/TVPA human rights class action was filed against Ferdinand Marcos, the former President of
the Philippines. 8 This case was not only the first command responsibility ATCA/TVPA case, but also the only human rights
class action to result in a jury judgment for a class of victims.
Several years later, a class of victims of subordinates of Radovan
Karadzic, the self-proclaimed president of Republika Srpska, also
filed suit and relied on Marcos as precedent. 9
1.

Hilao v Marcos.

After Ferdinand Marcos fled the Philippines to Hawaii in
1986, multiple plaintiffs filed separate cases against him in Hawaii and in the Northern District of California. These suits included one putative class action, Hilao v Marcos,"° involving more
than ten thousand plaintiffs. All of these cases were dismissed at
the district court level on the basis of the "act of state" doctrine.2
However, in a consolidated appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
and remanded on the grounds that Marcos was a private citizen
residing in the United States and that neither the Philippines nor
the United States objected to the judicial resolution of the

6 According to this doctrine, superiors may be held legally responsible for unlawful
acts of their subordinates. See Ford v Garcia, 289 F3d 1283, 1286-1294 (11th Cir 2002).
7 A handful of additional class actions have been brought against top leaders without

a clear articulation of the theory of liability. See, for example, Tachiona v Mugabe, 169 F
Supp 2d 259 (S D NY 2001) (dismissing class action as to head of state, but entering default judgment against ruling political party); Handel v Artukovic, 601 F Supp 1421, 1424
(C D Cal 1985) (putative class action against high Croatian official for his alleged involvement in the "deprivations of life and property suffered by the Jews in Yugoslavia
during World War II," including violations of the laws of war and crimes against humanity, dismissed on statute of limitations grounds).
l8Hilao v Estate of FerdinandMarcos, 103 F3d 767, 771 (9th Cir 1996).
Doe v Karadzic, 866 F Supp 734 (S D NY 1994).
See Hilao, 103 F3d at 774 (9th Cir 1996).
' Like the political question doctrine, the act of state doctrine precludes courts from
"inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory" in "the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles." Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 US 398,
401, 428 (1964).
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claims.22 Although Marcos died in 1989, his estate ("Estate") became the defendant in the litigation.23
On September 5, 1990, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation consolidated the actions in the District of Hawaii.24 In
1991, the court certified a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund class action" composed of "all civilian citizens of the Philippines who,
between 1972 and 1986, were tortured, summarily executed or
'disappeared' by Philippine military or paramilitary groups."26
The class included three subclasses, (1) individuals tortured by
Marcos's subordinates, (2) the heirs of individuals summarily executed by Marcos's subordinates, and (3) the heirs of individuals
"disappeared" by Marcos's subordinates.27
Although the class was technically mandatory, the court exercised its discretion under Rule 23(d) and required plaintiffs to
opt into the class by returning a completed claim form.28 Individuals and victims' organizations received notice of the suit
through the mail and via United States and Filipino publications.
Over ten thousand claims forms were received, of which some
were found to be facially invalid, although a few of those were
Trajano v Marcos, 878 F2d 1439, "1-2 (9th Cir 1989) (reversing and remanding all
dismissals).
See Hilao, 103 F3d at 771.
See In re Estate of FerdinandMarcos Litigation,25 F3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir 1994).
According to FRCP 23(b):
[Aln action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a
risk of ... (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
This form of class action is commonly called the "limited fund" class action because it
usually involves claims made by numerous individuals against a fund that is insufficient
to satisfy all the claims were plaintiffs to prevail. This class action protects the available
fund from depletion by prohibiting opt-outs and dividing the funds proportionally among
all plaintiffs. See 1966 Amendments, Advisory Committee Notes, 39 FRD 69, 101 ("This is
plainly the case when claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to
satisfy all claims. A class action by or against representative members to settle the validity of the claims as a whole, or in groups, followed by separate proof of the amount of each
valid claim and proportionate distribution of the fund, meets the problem."); Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp, 527 US 815, 838-44 (1999) (discussing requirements for limited fund class
action). This class action form is not subject to the notice, opt out, predominance or superiority conditions required for voluntary classes under FRCP 23(b)(3). See id.
See Hilao, 103 F3d at 774.
Id at 771, 774.
' In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, MLD 840-MLR, Order (D Haw
May 16, 1991) (setting forth notice plan) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
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later reinstated.2 9 Twenty-two individuals who could link Marcos
directly to the harm they had suffered (for example by proving
with evidence that he ordered or monitored their detention and
interrogation) proceeded against Marcos individually under theories of direct and command responsibility.
The district court trifurcated the consolidated trial into liability, punitive damages, and compensatory damages phases and
proceeded in that order. 1 In the first two phases, the jury found
the Estate liable to the class for acts of torture, summary execution, and disappearance and awarded $1.2 billion in punitive
damages. 2 The court appointed a Special Master to conduct the
compensatory damages phase.33 Recognizing the impracticality of
holding a mini-trial for each member of the class, the Special
Master borrowed a technique first employed in the asbestos context.34 He used statistical sampling to identify, and arrange for
the deposition of, a subset of 137 claimants; to determine a compensation schedule for various abuses; and to compute an aggregate judgment for compensatory damages. 35 The Special Master
reviewed each deposition transcript to determine whether the
claims fell within the class definitions-specifically that members
of the military or paramilitary forces under Marcos's command
committed or enabled the alleged harms, and that the abuses ocIn re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F Supp 1460, 1462 n 1 (D Haw
1995).
Hilao, 103 F3d at 771.
See Estate of Marcos, 910 F Supp at 1462. In order to prevent the Estate from
transferring any assets and to preserve the possibility of collecting any judgment, plaintiffs obtained an order prior to trial continuing a preliminary injunction that had been
obtained by the Republic of the Philippines in a separate action, but had been dissolved
upon the settlement of the underlying claims. See Republic of the Philippines v Marcos,
862 F2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir 1988) (affirming original preliminary injunction). Defendants'
appeal of the preliminary injunction came down after the Marcos liability and punitive
damages trials, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights
Litigation,25 F3d 1467, 1477-80 (9th Cir 1994).
32 See Estate of Marcos, 910 F Supp at 1463-64.
For a detailed discussion of the mechanics of the damages phase, see Sol Schreiber
and Laura D. Weissbach, In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation: A
PersonalAccount of the Role of the Special Master, 31 Loy LA L Rev 475 (1998).
See Cimino v Raymark Industries, 751 F Supp 649, 653 (E D Tex 1990). Cimino
was reversed on Seventh Amendment grounds after these techniques were employed and
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in the Hilao case. Cimino v Raymark Industries, 151 F3d
297, 321 (5th Cir 1998). The Fifth Circuit distinguished Hilao on the grounds that the
ATCA enabled the Ninth Circuit to apply substantive principles of federal or international
law, rather than state law, such that statistical sampling in that context did not contravene any substantive rights under state law vis-A-vis proof of causation or individual
damages. Id at 319.
' Estate of Marcos, 910 F Supp at 1461-65.
I
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curred during Marcos's reign.36 The Special Master also ranked
each torture claim on a scale based on the nature and extent of
the physical and mental torture suffered by the victim, the length
of detention, the age of the victim, and any actual financial
losses.3 7 He then recommended standard damage awards for various sets of facts. 8 The Special Master also recommended a compensation schedule, largely adopted by the jury." The jury
awarded over seven hundred million dollars in compensatory
damages to the class. The district court rejected the Estate's due
process and Seventh Amendment challenges to the statistical
methods employed to calculate the damages," and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the process and results.4'
In order to satisfy the judgment, in November 1995 the court
ordered the Estate to execute an assignment of Marcos's assets
that had been deposited in Swiss banks to the plaintiff class as
partial satisfaction of the jury judgment." The court also ordered
various Swiss banks to deposit into the court registry all of Marcos's assets that they held. 3 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated
this order on the grounds that the court could not levy the Swiss
banks' California branches that did not actually hold any of the
challenged assets."
Plaintiffs responded by filing suit against the parent banks
directly and seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction
prohibiting them from transferring or dissipating Marcos's assets. 5 On a petition for a writ of mandamus, the Ninth Circuit
dismissed the plaintiffs' suit against the banks on act of state
grounds, because the assets had been frozen by a federal executive order upon the request of the Republic of the Philippines.46
Following these enforcement attempts, the Swiss banks
hosted a series of negotiations between the Philippine govern"
37

See id at 1465.
Id.

Id.
3

40

Estate ofMarcos, 910 F Supp at 1465; Hilao, 103 F3d at 782-84.
Estate ofMarcos, 910 F Supp at 1467, 1469.

41 Hilao, 103

F3d at 786 ("While the district court's methodology in determining valid

claims is unorthodox, it can be justified by the extraordinarily unusual nature of this
case."). In dissent, Judge Rymer argued that causation and damages should be proved
individually. Id at 788.
Estate of Marcos, 910 F Supp at 1471 (describing order).
'3

4.

See Hilao v Estate of Marcos, 95 F3d 848, 851 (9th Cir 1996) (describing order).
Id.
See Credit Suisse v United States District Court for the Central
Districtof Califor-

nia, 130 F3d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir 1997) (recounting procedural history).
'
Id at 1347.
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ment, Marcos's heirs, and the human rights victims.47 The Estate
eventually settled the case for $150 million in 1998.48 On April 29,
1999, the district court affirmed the settlement, even though objectors traveled from the Philippines to testify against it on the
grounds that it included a statement denying Marcos's liability, it
represented too small a fraction of the compensatory damages
award, and it provided too great a fee to class counsel.49 In 1997,
the Swiss Supreme Court ordered the banks to transfer a portion
of Marcos's deposited funds to an escrow account in the Philippine National Bank, stating that the rights of the plaintiff class
should be taken into account with respect to the ultimate dissolution of the funds."° The Philippine government had to approve the
transfer of the money from a Swiss bank account holding $590
million in frozen Marcos family assets.51 Objectors filed briefs in
the Philippine court, contesting the settlement and the transfer of
the funds.5" The Philippine court refused to recognize the settlement, leading the U.S. court to vacate the settlement.53 Enforcement of the class judgment remains elusive, but a Philippine
court recently ruled that funds from several Swiss bank accounts
could be released to the government for distribution.54 Although
the majority of these funds will go toward the country's agrarian
17

See Manila says its claim on Marcos money superior to victims' claim, Deutsche

Press-Agentur (Apr 15, 1997).
"' The settlement included a 1986 default judgment that had been obtained against
Marcos's daughter, Imee Marcos-Manotoc. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Hu-

man Rights Litigation, 978 F2d 493, 495, 496-98 (9th Cir 1992) (affirming default and
rejecting arguments that defendant Manotoc should be accorded foreign sovereign immunity).
" In Re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, Judgment (D Haw Apr 29, 1999)
(approving settlement) (on file with U Chi Legal F ), Lori Tighe, $150 Million Settlement in
Marcos Suit Bittersweet, Honolulu Star-Bulletin (April 30, 1999); Rights victims reject 150million-dollarsettlement with Marcoses, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (March 11, 1999).
" In re Federal Office for Police Matters, Judgment by the Swiss Federal Supreme

Court, 1A.87/1997/err (December 10, 1997), at 91 6(c)(dd)-(hh); Anita Ramasastry, Secrets
and Lies? Swiss Banks and InternationalHuman Rights, 31 Vand J Transnatl L 325, 331-

32 (1998).
1 Cecille S. Visto, Leotes Marie T. Lugo and Jennee U. Rubrico, RP risks losing $630M Marcos money - Swift, Business World (February 11, 2000).
" See Republic of the Philippines v Marcos, Rejoinder to the Amicus Brief by Attor-

neys Domingo and Fruto and the "petition" of Rep Rosales, et al, Civ Case Nos 0141 and
SB 0185 (Sandiganbayan 1st Div June 21, 1999) (arguing that the majority of victims
oppose the settlement, because the settlement was obtained without consultation with
victims or victims' groups and that class counsel manipulated victims' NGOs in order to
garner attorneys' fees) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
' Philippines v Marcos, Civil Case Nos 0141 and 0185, slip op at 17 (Rep of Philippines, Sandiganbayan July 27, 1999), cited in Macinnon, 6 ILSA J Intl & Comp L at 571
n 11 (cited in note 7).
"' Who are entitled to compensation? Philippines Daily Inquirer, August 17, 2003.
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reform program, legislation is pending that would ensure that the
members of the class receive some percentage."
2. Doe v Karadzic.
The other command responsibility class action, Doe v
Karadzic,5 was filed against Radovan Karadzic, the selfproclaimed president of Republika Srpska in BosniaHerzegovina. 7 An individual action, Kadic v Karadzic," involving
several individual victims and women's organizations as plaintiffs was filed concurrently.59 The plaintiffs in both cases alleged
that they suffered abuses, including rape, summary execution,
torture, and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment at
the hands of Bosnian-Serb military forces under the command
and control of Karadzic.6' Prior to class certification, the district
court dismissed both actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (on the theory that non-state actors could not violate the law
of nations)."' The Second Circuit reversed, declaring that certain
international law violations do not require state action. 6
On remand, the Doe plaintiffs sought certification as a voluntary class under Rule 23(b)(3) or, in the alternative, as a limited
fund class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 5 ' The plaintiffs argued that,
regardless of the class option adopted, the court should require
notice and allow opt-out rights, in order to recognize the time and
expense already expended by the Kadic plaintiffs and the due
process rights of absentee class members.64

65

17

Id.
866 F Supp 734, 736 (S D NY 1994).
Id.

1997 WL 746512 (S D NY).
"

Id.

Karadzic, 866 F Supp at 735.
6' Id at 739-41.

Id at 736-37 (granting defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction), revd as Kadic v Karadzic, 70 F3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir 1995).
' See Doe v Karadzic, Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Class
Certification, No 93 Civ 878 (PLK) (S D NY July 3, 1997) (on file with U Chi Legal F). See
also Doe v Karadzic, Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Class Certification
(S D NY Oct 20, 1997) (seeking certification under FRCP 23(b)(1)(B) in the alternative) (on
file with U Chi Legal F). To obtain certification under this head of FRCP 23, it must be
shown that "the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."
Doe v Karadzic, Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Class Certification (S D NY Oct 20, 1997) at 6 n 7 (on file with U Chi Legal F).
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The court certified the plaintiffs as a limited fund class consisting of "all people who suffered injury as a result of rape, genocide, summary execution, arbitrary detention, disappearance,
torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment inflicted
by Bosnian-Serb Forces under the command and control of
[Karadzicl between April 1992 and the [ present."6" The court
chose to proceed under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) partially because of a letter written by the defendant to the court indicating that he did
not have the financial resources to bring witnesses for his defense
to the United States for depositions or trial.66 The court also noted
that the first set of plaintiffs to go to judgment would likely receive large awards and exhaust any funds available to other potential plaintiffs.67
In declining to certify the class as a voluntary class, the court
further noted that it had "grave doubts" about the plaintiffs' ability to satisfy the predominance and manageability requirements
of Rule 23(b)(3).6" In any case, the court noted that where either
class form is appropriate, courts should utilize the mandatory
option in order to avoid overburdening the court system.69 In this
ruling, the court reserved a discretionary decision, pursuant to
Rule 23(d)(5), on whether to allow class members to opt out of the
mandatory class.7"
The Kadic plaintiffs thereafter moved to opt out of the class.7 '
Although the Doe plaintiffs did not oppose this motion, the court
denied it at the outset,72 as well as upon reconsideration,7" because allowing the Kadic plaintiffs to proceed independently
could impair the ability of the class members to protect their interests. The court also determined that the claims and procedural
posture of the moving plaintiffs' case were not significantly dis-

Doe v Karadzic, 176 FRD 458, 461 (S D NY 1997).
Id at 463.
67 Id. ("[Clertification [as a limited fund class] will prevent a situation where
one
plaintiff lays claim to the lion's share of defendant's limited resources, leaving thousands
of others with nothing simply because they lost the race to the courthouse.").
Id.
6'Karadzic, 176 FRD at 463 (citing Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil 2d § 1772).
7' Doe v Karadzic, 182 FRD 424, 463 (S D NY 1998).
7' Rule 23(d)(5) authorizes the district court to issue procedural orders in the conduct
of class actions.
" Karadzic, 182 FRD at 425.
73 Doe v Karadzic, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 24, *1 (S D NY).
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tinguishable from those of the class, such that opting out was appropriate or necessary.74
Subsequent to that decision, the Supreme Court decided
Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp,75 which significantly limited the availability of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) classes in those mass tort cases that
deviate from the traditional model of a limited fund class.76 Citing
Ortiz, the Kadic plaintiffs moved to decertify the class." The
court, exercising its duty to revisit its certification decision in
light of subsequent legal developments, decertified the class.78
The court explained that the plaintiffs had failed to present facts
establishing the existence of a limited fund.79 Subsequently, a
dozen former members of the Doe class successfully moved to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(2) as
plaintiffs," and both cases proceeded to massive default judgments.8 1 The case has never been appealed, and the judgment
remains unexecuted.
" Karadzic, 182 FRD at 428.

527 US 815 (1999).
In Ortiz, the Court held that the "limited fund" rationale is not appropriate to aggregate unliquidated tort claims without evidence that there are truly insufficient funds to
satisfy the judgment, the whole fund would be devoted to the claimants, and the claimants
would be treated equitably among themselves and proceed under a common theory of
recovery. Id at 838-39. The Court was concerned that mandatory class actions that depart
from this model have the potential to offend the due process principle that one is not
bound by a judgment in an action in which one was not a party. Id at 846. The Court did
not, however, entirely preclude the use of mandatory limited fund class actions in the
mass tort context. Id at 862 ("While we have not ruled out the possibility under the present Rule of a mandatory class to deal with mass tort litigation on a limited fund rationale, we are not free to dispense with the safeguards that have protected mandatory class
members under that theory traditionally.").
7'

7

'7

Doe v Karadzic, 192 FRD 133, 135 (S D NY 2000).

Id at 144.
7 Id at 141-42.
Doe v Karadzic, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 8108, *7 (SD NY):
[A]lthough the specific injuries of each potential plaintiff differ in their
disturbing details, the Intervenors' claims 'present the same core of operative facts' as those of the existing plaintiffs, at least with respect to
their allegation that the defendant ordered, knew, or should have known
of acts deliberately and intentionally inflicted by forces under his command and control.
(internal citation omitted). The fact that the case proceeded despite the decertification of
the class belies the conventional wisdom that the failure to achieve certification inevitably
sounds the death knell for the suit. See also Beanal v Freeport-McMoRan,Inc, 969 F Supp
362, 367 (E D La 1997) (putative class representative missed the certification deadline but
proceeded individually).
" The Kadic plaintiffs obtained a $745 million judgment against Karadzic. See Christine Haughney and Bill Miller, Karadzic Told To Pay Victims $745 Million, Wash Post

A13 (Aug 11, 2000). Some time later, a $4.5 billion judgment was awarded in the Doe case.

HeinOnline -- 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 291 2003

292

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2003:

B. Corporate Cases
A number of additional ATCA and TVPA class actions have
been brought against multinational corporations82 that are engaged in resource extraction or offshore production in so-called
"developing countries." 3 These putative classes have asserted a
variety of claims. Some have challenged the operation of joint
venture projects between multilateral corporations and host governments. Others have criticized corporate policies concerning,
among other things, environmental safeguards, the provision of
security to facilities and pipelines, land use, and labor practices.84
The majority of the class action cases waged against corporations

See David Rohde, Jury in New York Orders Bosnian Serb to Pay Billions, NY Times A10

(Sept 26, 2000).
" The Karadzic case in many respects paved the way for these corporate cases by
recognizing that private actors may be liable for certain international law violations.
Kadic v Karadzic, 70 F3d 232, 236 (2d Cir 1995) ("[Wle hold that subject-matter jurisdiction exists, that Karadzic may be found liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity in his private capacity and for other violations in his capacity as a state actor.").
But see Sanchez-Espinoza v Reagan, 770 F2d 202, 206-07 (DC Cir 1985) (dismissing
claims of torture and rape against Nicaraguan Contras where court was "aware of no
treaty that purports to make the activities at issue here unlawful when conducted by
private individuals. As for the law of nations so-called 'customary international law' ...
we conclude that this also does not reach private, non-state conduct of this sort.") (internal
citation omitted).
' For a more detailed discussion of these corporate cases see Lisa Lambert, Note, At
the Crossroads of Environmental and Human Rights Standards:Aguinda v Texaco, Inc.
Using the Alien Tort Claims Act To Hold Multinational Corporate Violators of International Laws Accountable in U.S. Courts, 10 J Transnatl L & Pol 109 (2000); Peggy Rodgers
Kalas, The Implications of Jota v Texaco and the Accountability of TransnationalCorpora-

tions, 12 Pace Intl L Rev 47 (2000); Anastasia Khokhryakova, Note, Beanal v FreeportMcMoRan, Inc: Liability of a Private Actor for an InternationalEnvironmental Tort Under

the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 Colo J Intl Envir L & Pol 463, 471-81 (1998).
See, for example, Sarei v Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F Supp 2d 1116 (C D Cal 2002) (alleging that mining operations in Papua New Guinea destroyed the environment and harmed
the health of citizens and that the corporation engaged in war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and racial discrimination); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy,

Complaint at 24 (SD NY Feb 25, 2002) (seeking class certification on behalf of a class of
"non-Muslim, African Sudanese residents of areas within fifty (50) miles of the [petroleum
company] or other oil concession areas and transportation routes in the Sudan" who suffered abuses in connection with oil exploration in the region) (on file with U Chi Legal F ),
Arias v DynCorp., Complaint at 9 58-135 (D DC Sept 11, 2001), available online at
http://www.laborrights.org/ (last checked September 23, 2003) (alleging corporate responsibility for torture, environmental destruction, crimes against humanity, cultural genocide, negligence, trespass, nuisance, medical monitoring, etc., stemming from defendants'
use of toxic herbicide in Colombia); Bao Ge v Li Peng, 201 F Supp 2d 14 (D Col 2000) (dismissing complaint alleging that Adidas and Chinese governmental agencies were responsible for forced prison labor); Beanal v Freeport-McMoRan, Inc, 969 F Supp 362 (E D La
1997), affd 197 F3d 161 (5th Cir 1999) (alleging that defendant's mining operation in
Indonesia caused environmental destruction).
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have been dismissed prior to class certification or have had certification denied. This Part will discuss some exemplary cases.
1. Jota v Texaco.
Several class actions have been filed against Texaco in connection with its petroleum operations in Ecuador. The first, Sequihua v Texaco, Inc,85 was removed to the Southern District of
Texas, which dismissed the case on the basis of forum non conveniens and international comity.86 Soon thereafter, Aguinda v
Texaco, Inc" was filed in the Southern District of New York,
where Texaco is headquartered, on behalf of thirty thousand indigenous citizens of Ecuador alleging that the company had engaged in large-scale environmental abuses in the Ecuadorian rain
forest." Abuses alleged included the generation of toxic spills and
other pollution, the unlawful and harmful disposal of hazardous
wastes, and the spoliation of the rain forest habitat and plaintiffs'
property.89
Plaintiffs sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3) and alleged
that these abuses impacted their rights to life, liberty, and the
security of their person. Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages
under theories of negligence, public nuisance, strict liability, civil
conspiracy, and trespass. They also requested specific equitable
relief to remedy the spoliation, restore the environment, and rebuild the allegedly faulty oil-pumping infrastructure." Specifically, plaintiffs sought:
undertaking or financing environmental cleanup, to include access to potable water and hunting and fishing
grounds, renovating or closing the Trans-Ecuadoran Pipeline, creation of an environmental monitoring fund, formulating standards to govern future Texaco oil development,
creation of a medical monitoring fund, an injunction restraining Texaco from entering into activities that run a

847 F Supp 61 (S D Tex 1994).
Id at 63-64.
1994 US Dist LEXIS 4718 (S D NY).
The class was initially defined as comprising all individuals who at any time from
1972 to the present resided in a particular region of Ecuador. See Aguinda v Texaco, Inc,
Complaint at 19 (S D NY Nov 3, 1993) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
Id at 21-27.
See Jota v Texaco, Inc, 157 F3d 153, 155-56 (2d Cir 1998) (describing allegations
and relief sought).
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high risk of environmental or human injuries, and restitution.9,
In 1994, a companion class action suit was filed, Ashanga v Texaco, Inc, 9' by a class of twenty-five thousand indigenous persons
and tribes residing in the downstream Peruvian rain forest, setting forth similar allegations about cross-border environmental
harm resulting from Texaco's management of its oil extraction
projects in Ecuador."
Aguinda and Ashanga have complex procedural histories involving several years of legal challenge by Texaco94 and apparent
dissension among plaintiffs' counsel. 95 Ultimately, following the
death of the judge initially assigned to Aguinda, the court dismissed the two cases on grounds of forum non conveniens, international comity, and the failure to join indispensable parties,96
relying on the precedent of the Sequihua case." The Aguinda and
Ashanga appeals were consolidated in Jota v Texaco," and the
Second Circuit vacated the dismissals and remanded the cases,
partially because Texaco would have to consent to jurisdiction
before the Ecuadorian courts in order to make dismissal on the
basis of forum non conveniens appropriate." On remand, Texaco
9' Id at 156 n 2.

' Complaint on File with U of Chi L F
93 See Jota, 157 F3d at 155 (describing Ashanga case).

In particular, Texaco moved to dismiss the suit on forum non conveniens and other
grounds, but the court reserved its ruling to allow for limited discovery concerning events
relating to the harm alleged by plaintiffs that occurred in the United States and to events
outside the United States subject to voluntary discovery. Aguinda v Texaco Inc, 1994 US
Dist LEXIS 4718, *3-4 (S D NY), affd on reconsideration, 850 F Supp 282 (S D NY 1994).
That said, the court did indicate that it was inclined to dismiss plaintiffs' class action
damages claims due to the difficulty of litigating such claims in a United States court, but
noted that retaining plaintiffs' equitable relief claims may be appropriate to the extent
plaintiffs' desired relief could be enforced entirely within the United States. Id at *11-12.
See, for example, Aguinda v Texaco, Inc, Memorandum and Decision and Order (S
D NY June 19, 1995) (noting withdrawn motion for substitution of counsel) (on file with U
Chi Legal F); Aguinda v Texaco, Inc, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 18364, "1-2 (S D NY) (denying
plaintiffs' motion for the creation of a structure for plaintiffs' representatives).
Aguinda v Texaco, Inc, 945 F Supp 625, 626-27 (S D NY 1996).
9, Id; see Sequihua v Texaco, Inc, 847 F Supp 61 (S D Tex 1994).
157 F3d at 155.

98

Id. At the time Aguinda was filed, Ecuador issued a statement indicating that it
opposed the case because it had determined that allowing it to proceed in U.S. courts
would provide a disincentive to investors. Aguinda, 1994 US Dist LEXIS at *28. After a
change of government in Ecuador while the case was pending appeal, the Ecuadorian
government moved to intervene, stating its support for the litigation proceeding in the
United States. See Aguinda v Texaco, Inc, 175 FRD 50, 51 (S D NY 1997). In light of this
change in governmental policy, the Aguinda plaintiffs moved for reconsideration. The
district court denied the motion for reconsideration and ruled that the motion to intervene
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renewed its motions to dismiss both cases on forum non conveniens grounds and consented to jurisdiction in Ecuador and/or
Peru.'00 The court eventually granted these motions,' and these
decisions were affirmed on appeal. °2 The case against Texaco will
proceed in Ecuador in October 2003.
2. Doe v Unocal.
Similarly, in Doe v Unocal Corp, a plaintiff class brought
suit against Unocal; Total S.A.;... the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise ("MOGE"); the government of Burma, formerly known as
the State Law and Order Council ("SLORC"); °5 and several corporate officials.0 6 In a revised briefing, the putative class was defined as:
all residents of the Tenasserim region of Burma ... who

have been, are, or will be subject to the following acts in
furtherance of the Yadana gas pipeline project in which
defendants are joint venturers: forced relocation, forced
labor, torture, violence against women, arbitrary arrest
and detention, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,
crimes against humanity, the death of family members,
battery, false imprisonment, assault, negligent hiring, or
negligent supervision. 7

was untimely. Id. Upon vacating the dismissal, the Second Circuit ordered the district
court to consider the new government's position on remand. Jota, 157 F3d at 160-61.
" Aguinda v Texaco, Inc, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 745, *10 (S D NY) (reserving judgment
on dismissal pending additional briefing on whether the courts of Ecuador provide an
adequate forum). In the meantime, both sets of plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought the
recusal of Judge Rakoff on the grounds that the judge attended a conference that was
partially funded by Texaco and the cases had been in abeyance for an inordinate amount
of time. Aguinda v Texaco, Inc, 139 F Supp 2d 438, 439-40 (S D NY 2000). The Second
Circuit denied plaintiffs' writ of mandamus. In re Aguinda, 241 F3d 194, 198 (2d Cir
2001).
'0 Aguinda v Texaco, Inc, 142 F Supp 2d 534, 537 (S D NY 2001).
102 Aguinda v Texaco, Inc, 303 F3d 470, 473 (2d Cir 2002).
1
963 F Supp 880 (C D Cal 1997).
0
The case against Total was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Doe v Unocal
Corp, 27 F Supp 2d 1174, 1179 (C D Cal 1998), affd 248 F3d 915 (9th Cir 2001).
" Suits against MOGE and the SLORC were dismissed on foreign sovereign immunity grounds. Doe v Unocal Corp, 963 F Supp 880, 884 (C D Cal 1997).
1
A companion case was brought on behalf of several individuals, the exiled democratic government of Burma, and the Burmese Federation of Trade Unions. See National
Coalition Government of Union of Burma v Unocal, Inc, 176 FRD 329, 342 (C D Cal 1997)
(allowing case to go forward on behalf of individual plaintiffs and labor organization).
107 Doe v Unocal Corp, 67 F Supp 2d 1140, 1141 (C D Cal 1999).
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Plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief,
alleging that the corporate defendants were engaged in a joint
venture with the SLORC and knowingly allowed the SLORC's
military, intelligence, and police forces to employ violence and
intimidation to relocate entire villages, enslave people in areas in
which the pipeline was being installed, and confiscate property,
and that the joint venture (and thus the companies) benefited
from these practices.' 8
Plaintiffs eventually sought certification under Rule 23(b)(2)
for injunctive and declaratory relief.' 9 They sought an order compelling Unocal to terminate its participation in the joint enterprise and its payments to the SLORC until the human rights violations ceased. ' The court ruled that the class representatives
lacked standing to seek this relief on behalf of the proposed class.
Although they had demonstrated that they would again be subject to the contested abuses,"' they could not show that the desired relief would protect against this threat.' The court concluded that the abuses would not likely stop with Unocal's withdrawal because the SLORC was committing them. Moreover,
other oil companies, including Total, might take Unocal's place in
the joint venture." 3 Finally, the court noted that the construction
of the pipeline was substantially completed so that injunctive relief was inapposite."' Subsequently, the district court granted
summary judgment to Unocal because Unocal could not be held
responsible for acts of the SLORC under the theories of liability
Unocal, 963 F Supp at 884-85.
Unocal, 67 F Supp 2d at 1140-41.
"10Id at 1145.
...Id at 1143-44.
"' Id at 1144. In so ruling, the court rejected defendants' arguments that because
plaintiffs were refugees in Thailand at the time certification was sought, they were no
longer "residents" of the Tenasserim region as contemplated by plaintiffs' class definition.
Id at 1142-43. The court noted that it could amend the class definition to resolve such
definitional ambiguities. Id at 1143.
"' Unocal, 67 F Supp 2d at 1146 ("[Any relief afforded plaintiffs depends ... on the
independent actions of individuals or corporate entities who are not parties to this lawsuit."); Unocal, 67 F Supp 2d at 1147:
Because Unocal's share [of the project] does not make up a substantial
part of the funding and construction of the pipeline is complete, any equitable relief enjoining Unocal's participation would not be likely to effect
the operation of the pipeline or more critically, the elimination of human
rights violations in furtherance of the project. Instead, the cessation of
these alleged illegal acts would depend on the independent actions of
companies and governmental entities who are not parties to this lawsuit.
,' Id at 1147.
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advanced by plaintiffs."5 Although the case was reinstated by the
17
Ninth Circuit," 6 it was recently subject to en banc review.
C. Historical Justice Cases
A number of class actions were filed in U.S. courts against
German, Swiss, Japanese, French, and other national banks and
enterprises alleging harms inflicted during the WWII period. 1
These cases involve international law allegations-including the
use of forced and slave labor, sexual slavery, and torture-as well
as various municipal contractual and tort claims for relief (such
as conversion, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment). Most
cases involving European defendants were resolved prior to class
certification through broad-based settlements or executive action
brokered by interested governments, non-governmental organizations, and other key figures in addition to the parties' lawyers."9
In contrast, the cases involving Japanese defendants have not
succeeded and have to date been dismissed.
1. The Swiss Bank cases.
After attempts to reach a negotiated solution to the lingering
problem of dormant Swiss bank accounts stalled in 1996 and
1997, 120 survivors of the Holocaust and their heirs filed four class

...Doe v Unocal Corp, 110 F Supp 2d 1294, 1296 (C D Cal 2000).
Doe v Unocal Corp, 2002 US App LEXIS 19263, *35-38 (9th Cir) (finding plaintiffs'
theory of complicity liability to be viable).
Doe v Unocal Corp, 2003 US App LEXIS 2716, *2-3 (9th Cir).
IS For a more detailed discussion of the European historical justice cases, see Michael
J. Bazyler, Holocaust Justice: The Battle for Restitution in America's Courts (NYU 2003)
and John Authers and Richard Wolffe, The Victim's Fortune: Inside the Epic Battle Over
the Debts of the Holocaust (Harper Collins 2002). In total, over seventy class actions were
filed arising out of the WWII period. Morris A. Ratner, The Settlement of Nazi-era Litigation Through the Executive and Judicial Branches, 20 Berkeley J Intl L 212, 213 n 3
(2002).
"" In addition to the three sets of cases discussed in Part C, a number of additional
class actions were filed against European insurance companies. See, for example, In re
Assicurazioni Generali spa Holocaust InsuranceLitigation, 228 F Supp 2d 348, 353 (S D
NY 2002) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens in part on the
determination that the non-governmental International Commission on Holocaust Era
Insurance Claims did not constitute an adequate alternative forum to litigate plaintiffs'
claims).
'
For a more detailed discussion of the Swiss bank cases, see Ramasastry, 31 Vand J
Transnatl L at 325 (cited in note 50); Detlev Vagts and Peter Murray, Litigating the Nazi
Labor Claims: The Path Not Taken, 43 Harv Intl L J 503 (2002); Michael J. Bazyler,
www.swissbankclaims.com: The Legality and Morality of the Holocaust-Era Settlement
with the Swiss Banks, 25 Fordham Intl L J 64 (2001); Jeffrey Craig Mickletz, Comment,
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actions against the three largest Swiss banks.'21 They alleged that

the banks were complicit in the Nazi government's efforts to convert plundered assets and profit from slave labor during the
WWII period. 2 2 In particular, the various classes alleged that the
banks became the primary means for the Nazi regime to liquidate
and convert victims' wealth into currency because the banks
knowingly accepted looted assets, concealed and converted assets
deposited by Jewish victims, profited from deposits generated by
forced labor, and intentionally concealed and prevented the recovery of deposited assets.2 3 Plaintiffs' claims included breach of
contract, accounting, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, violations of international law, negligence, fraud, and fraudulent concealment. 124 Plaintiffs' theories of
liability invoked concepts of conspiracy, fraud on the market, and
market share liability, 25 because in many cases it was impossible
to link specific banks to precise assets. Plaintiffs also alleged that
this problem of proof resulted from defendants' purposeful concealment of evidence.'26 Plaintiffs sought compensatory and equiAn Analysis of the $1.25 Billion Settlement Between the Swiss Banks and Holocaust Survivors and Holocaust Victims' Heirs, 18 Dick J Intl L 199 (1999).
'' After being lobbied for years, the Swiss Bankers Association entered into an
agreement on May 2, 1996, with the World Jewish Restitution Organization and the
World Jewish Congress to set up an "Independent Committee of Eminent Persons" headed
by Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank to examine the fate
of dormant accounts in Switzerland and to establish a claims resolution process for these
funds. See Roger P. Alford, The Claims Resolution Tribunal and Holocaust Claims Against
Swiss Banks, 20 Berkeley J Intl L 250, 250, 254-55 (2002). However, victims groups grew
increasingly frustrated with the pace and operations of the Committee and eventually
filed suit. See William Z. Slany, Historian, Department of State, U.S. and Allied Efforts To
Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany
During World War II, Preliminary Study at viii (May 1997), available online at
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ngrpt.pdf, (visited September 23, 2003).
Over the years, the inflexibility of the Swiss Bankers' Association and other Swiss
banks made it extremely difficult for surviving family members of Nazi victims to successfully file claims to secure bank records and other assets. This overall pattern of apparent
Swiss bankers' indifference to the needs of the victims of the Holocaust and their heirs
persisted until the current international pressures came to bear. See Sean D. Murphy,
Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 93 Am J Intl L
879, 891 (1999).
" See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F Supp 2d 139, 141 (E D NY
2000). Similar class actions filed against Austrian banks were also settled under the auspices of Senator Alfonse D'Amato as Special Master. See In re Austrian and German Bank
Holocaust Litigation,80 F Supp 2d 164, 180 (S D NY 2000) (approving settlement of forty
million dollars and denying motion to intervene as untimely), affd as D'Amato v Deutsche
Bank, 236 F3d 78, 87 (2d Cir 2001).
" See Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F Supp 2d at 141.
IN

Id.

" Id.
Ramasastry, 31 Vand J Transnatl L at 379-80 (cited in note 50).
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table relief, including an accounting and the disgorgement of
profits from looted, cloaked, and deposited assets.127
In 1997, the four class actions were consolidated for pretrial
purposes only. 12' Defendants moved to dismiss the suits, arguing,
among other things, that the court should abstain because of ongoing efforts at non-judicial initiatives to redress plaintiffs'
claims. 1 9 Before the court considered the motions to dismiss or
issues surrounding class certification and at the court's invitation, the parties began settlement discussions."13 A number of key
organizations, nations, and individuals, including Jewish restitution organizations, the government of Israel, and officials of the
United States Department of State supported the settlement discussions. 31 In 1998, a settlement was reached, which resulted in
the creation of a $1.2 billion settlement fund, a waiver of all defenses by the defendant banks, the revival of claims that may
have otherwise expired, and a release from liability by all the
plaintiffs partaking in the settlement. 2 In 1999, the court preliminarily approved the settlement,'33 which included five settlement subclasses: individuals deprived of their deposited assets by
the defendant banks; individuals whose assets were looted or
cloaked by the defendant banks; individuals forced to become
refugees because they were not admitted into or were deported
from Switzerland;'34 and two classes of individuals who were subjected to forced labor.' The notice scheme implemented to con12

Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F Supp 2d at
141-42.

12

Id.
Id.

129

" See generally In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 225 F3d 191, 193-94 (2d Cir
2000); Ratner, 20 Berkeley J Intl L at 215-16 (discussing structure of settlement negotiations) (cited in note 118).
...Holocaust Victims, 225 F3d at 193-94.
'
Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F Supp 2d at 142-43.
133 See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 18014, *3
(E D
NY).
" This class was composed of victims or targets of persecution that were denied entry
into or deported from Switzerland. These individuals did not necessarily have claims
against the defendant banks. Nonetheless, the Swiss government insisted upon the inclusion of this class in order to ensure that the settlement was a global "all Switzerland"
settlement. See Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F Supp 2d at 143-44.
"s Holocaust Victim Assets, 105 F Supp 2d at 143-44. See also Bazyler, 25 Fordham
Intl L J at 71, 84-85 (cited in note 120). Four of the five subclasses were composed only of
Jewish, Romani, Jehovah's Witness, homosexual, and physically or mentally disabled or
handicapped persons who were victims of Nazi persecution; in contrast, one slave labor
class comprised anyone who performed slave labor for any entity based in Switzerland.
Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F Supp 2d at 161-62. On the final day to file objections to the settlement, an organization representing Polish victims of the Nazi era, the
Polish American Defense Committee, and several individuals filed a motion to intervene,
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tact members of the various classes and enable individuals to opt
out of the settlement has been described as the most ambitious
effort ever to notify members of a putative class. 136 Consuming 2%
of the settlement (twenty-five million dollars), this "multi-faceted
notice plan" included multilingual direct mail, worldwide publication in over five hundred newspapers, public relations efforts, the
creation of survivors'37 organizations, and internet and community
outreach measures.
In light of the settlement, the court held a fairness hearing
pursuant to Rule 23(e) in which it examined both the process by
which the settlement was reached and the substantive terms of
the settlement. 3 The fact that numerous attorneys involved in
the suit had waived their attorneys' fees favored a finding that
the settlement did not result from collusion or self-dealing by and
among counsel. 139 Any fees sought were capped at 1.8% of the
fund and were disbursed through the lodestar formula for time
expended. 4 ° Additionally, the court, relying upon factors set forth
in City of Detroit v Grinnell Corp,' determined that the settlement was substantively fair. In particular, the court noted that
the defendants had raised significant questions regarding
whether plaintiffs could pursue their claims under international
or municipal law and that strong moral claims are not necessarily
easily converted into successful legal causes of action.'42 Under

seeking to amend the settlement to include ethnic Polish victims in all five subclasses. In
particular, the interveners argued that as a result of conflicts of interest on the part of
class representatives and counsel, the definition of the class had been narrowed, thus
improperly excluding them from four of the five sub-classes. The district court's denial of
this motion was affirmed on appeal on the grounds that the motion was untimely and that
allowing the intervention would jeopardize the settlement. Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 225 F3d at 199.
" See Bazyler, 25 Fordham Intl L J at 68 (cited in note 120) (citing Henry Weinstein,
Search Opens for Holocaust Claimants, LA Times A3 (June 29, 1999)).
13' Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F Supp 2d at 144-45, 166.
See id at 145.
'

Id at 145-46.
Id at 146.
495 F2d 448 (2d Cir 1974). See id at 463 (obliging the court to look to (1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the
settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the
risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of maintaining the class action through trial; (6)
the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (7) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible recovery; and (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of the attendant risks of
litigation).
"

Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F Supp at 148-49; In re Holocaust Victim

Assets Litigation, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 15644 (E D NY) (final order and judgment). See
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the supervision of a Special Master, payments to claimants finally began in late 2001 after the settlement agreement had been
finalized, the complex notice scheme had been effectuated, the
fairness appeals process (which included a teleconference hearing
with survivors in Israel) exhausted, Swiss intransigence to sharing files overcome, and an allocation program created and coordinated with the work of the Independent Committee of Eminent
Persons (headed by Paul Volcker) and nascent German restitution efforts.
2. The German Industry cases.
Beginning in 1998, many of the lawyers working on the Swiss
bank cases filed similar class action suits against German induso
1441
Some of the early
trial, financial, and insurance enterprises.
German class action cases were dismissed before sufficient political momentum developed to achieve the type of broad-based resolution obtained in the Swiss bank cases. For example, in
Iwanowa v Ford Motor Co,' 5 a putative voluntary class alleged
that defendants had forced members of the class to perform slave
labor under inhumane conditions between 1941 and 1945. The
suit was dismissed prior to certification on multiple grounds, including the expiration of the statute of limitations, the nonjusticiable political questions in the case, the failure to state a
that the resolution
claim upon which relief could be granted, and
comity.4 6
of the suit would offend international
also In re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litigation, 80 F Supp 2d at 177 (noting

significant legal impediments to plaintiffs' claims in historical justice cases).
' Bazyler, 25 Fordham Intl L J at 67, 81-85 (describing obstacles to settlement)
(cited in note 120).
,' See generally Kara C. Ryf, Note, Burger-Fischer v Degussa AG U.S. Courts Allow
Siemens and Degussa to Profit from Holocaust Slave Labor, 33 Case W Res J Intl L 155
(2001); Stuart M. Kreindler, Comment, History'sAccounting: Liability Issues Surrounding
German Companies for the Use of Slave Labor by Their Corporate Forefathers, 18 Dick J

Intl L 343 (2000); http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/holocausthp.html (visited June
29, 2003) (containing research, press statements, and other materials about the cases);

Justin H. Roy, Comment, Strengthening Human Rights Protection: Why the Holocaust
Slave Labor Claims Should be Litigated, 1 Scholar 153 (1999) (discussing German enter-

prise cases).
67 F Supp 2d 424 (D NJ 1999).
See id at 461-68. Likewise, Burger-Fischerv DegussaAG, 65 F Supp 2d 248 (D NJ
1999), disposed of the claims of four putative class actions seeking to represent, for example, classes consisting of:
all Holocaust victims and survivors, their heirs and beneficiaries, who
were injured as a result of Degussa's independent conduct in, and participation in the Nazi regime's systematic practices of (i) looting personal
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Notwithstanding these initial rulings, additional class actions were filed against a number of other German enterprises."'
In contrast to the Swiss bank cases, in which plaintiffs' claims
generally sounded in contract, 48 the German industry cases involved claims for substantive international law violations, such
as the utilization of slave labor and torture.1 49 In 1998, prior to
any rulings on class certification, negotiations began among the
class action lawyers, Stuart Eizenstat (then U.S. Under Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs), representatives from German industry, diplomats from interested states, non-governmental organizations, and others, to design a joint state/industry restitution fund.15 ° This initiative resulted in a July 17, 2000 executive
agreement ("Agreement") between the United States and Germany expressing support for the "Remembrance, Responsibility
and the Future" Foundation ("Foundation") created by the German Parliament to administer funds collected from German industry and the government. 5 ' Although the plaintiffs' lawyers
property, including but not limited to gold, jewelry, eyeglasses, watches
and dental gold; (ii) using and profiting from slave and/or forced labor;
and (iii) manufacturing, marketing, and profiting from the sale to the
Nazi regime of Zyklon B, a key component of the Nazi regime's program
of genocide.
Id at 252. Plaintiffs sought restitution and disgorgement as well as compensation for violations of international law. Id at 252-53. Like Iwanowa, the case was dismissed on political question grounds. Id at 282. Plaintiffs did not pursue appeals in these early cases as
international negotiations toward the creation of a restitution fund had been initiated.
Stephen Whinston, Can Lawyers and Judges be Good Historians?:A CriticalExamination

of the Siemens Slave-Labor Cases, 20 Berkeley J Intl L 160, 160, 167 (2002). See also
Fishel v BASF Group, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 21230, *19-22 (S D Iowa) (dismissing putative
class action filed on behalf of WWII forced labor victims for lack of personal jurisdiction
over defendant corporations).
" All cases against German enterprises, including industrial corporations and insurance companies, were ultimately consolidated in the district of New Jersey. In re Nazi Era
Cases Against German Defendants Litigation, 198 FRD 429, 430 (citing Transfer Order,

Docket No. 1337 (August 4, 2000)).
118

See Part I.C.1.

See generally Kreindler, 18 Dick J Intl Law at 349-56 (cited in note 144).
150

See generally In re: Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litigation, 198

FRD 429, 431-32 (D NJ 2000) (describing negotiation process). Similar funds have been
created for individuals who provided slave or forced labor on Austrian territory, see
http://www.reconciliationfund.at/history.htm (visited September 23,2003), and with claims
involving property in Austria, see http://www.nationalfonds.org/aef/english/index.htm
(visited September 23, 2003).
"' United States-Germany: Agreement Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance,
Responsibility and the Future," 39 ILM 1298 (2000) ("Agreement"). One of the stated
purposes of the Foundation was "to lay the groundwork for countering lawsuits, particularly class actions in the USA, and remove the rationale for any campaigns against the
reputation of our country and its business community." Murphy, 93 Am J Intl L at 886
(cited in note 121).
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participated in the execution of the Agreement and the establishment of the Foundation, neither effort technically represents
a settlement of the class action lawsuits.
The Foundation will consolidate the funds provided by the
German government and German industry, and will provide
payments totaling close to $4.8 billion to almost one million former slaves and forced laborers, victims whose property was confiscated, and persons wrongly denied insurance claims. This is
the biggest restitution fund ever created in the history of human
rights claims in U.S. courts. 153 It intends to be the "exclusive remedy and forum" for the resolution of all claims filed against Ger5
Pursuant to this Agreement, the United States
man industry."
agreed to file statements of interest in all pending cases advising
the court of its foreign policy interests in keeping the Foundation
as the sole source of compensation for WWII-era victims of Ger5 In exchange for compenman industry human rights violations."
sation, plaintiffs provided German industry with "legal peace" by
voluntarily dismissing, with prejudice, all outstanding lawsuits.
This included over forty putative class action suits that required
court approval for settlement.1 6 Pursuant to Rule 23(e), the court
approved the settlement of the class actions, dismissed the majority of the class actions with consent and prejudice,'57 and ruled
that notice to the putative class was not required because the
class had never been certified. 158 Individual victims have begun to
receive between twenty five and seventy five hundred dollars
each, depending upon the degree of the harm they suffered.159 In
particular, slave laborers, defined as those individuals detained
in concentration camps, received the highest awards. These dis-

152

The majority of the other WWII cases were similarly resolved through executive,

rather than judicial, action. Ratner, 20 Berkeley J Intl L at 213 (cited in note 118). See
also id at 230-32 (arguing for superiority of court-administered settlement within the
structural safeguards of Rule 23 over executive branch negotiations and agreement).
'
See Kreindler, 18 Dick J Intl L at 343 (cited in note 144).
Art 1, Agreement, 39 ILM at 1299.
Art 2(1), Agreement, 39 ILM at 1300. See also Nazi Era Cases, 198 FRD at 435.
'6 See Nazi Era Cases, 198 FRD at 430, 438-39.
.. But see In re Austrian, German Holocaust Litigation, 250 F3d 156, 159-65 (2d Cir
2001) (granting petition for mandamus and ordering dismissal of German cases with consent despite district court's concerns about the implementation of the settlement).
" See Nazi Era Cases, 198 FRD at 444-46. The individual actions were also dismissed. See Nazi Era Cases, 129 F Supp 2d 370, 383-84 (D NJ 2001) (dismissing case
without consent on international comity and political question grounds in light of the
Agreement and a U.S. statement of interest filed in the case).
1"9 See Vagts and Murray, 43 Harv Intl L J at 522 (cited in note 120).
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parities in awards resulted in significant acrimony between concentration camp victims and other forced labor victims.16
3. The Japanesecases.
The majority of the Japanese class actions have not achieved
the same success as the European cases.' For example, a class
action against Japan was filed in the District of Columbia, seeking monetary damages and a declaration that Japan had engaged
in crimes against humanity in connection with its administration
of the "comfort women" program during World War II.62 In contrast to the executive support accorded the European class actions, the Bush administration filed a statement of interest urging the court not to hear the case on political question grounds.'63
The court ruled that no exception for sovereign immunity existed
and that the action involved non-justiciable political questions
concerning the propriety of post-WWII treaties with Japan and
the right to war reparations that compelled dismissal."4 This case
is currently on appeal to the D.C. Circuit.
Likewise, In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor
Litigation... concerned a series of class actions involving Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and United States WWII veterans forced
to labor without compensation during the War. These veterans
sought damages and other remedies from the Japanese companies for whom they had worked. The cases invoked a 1999 California statute allowing individuals forced to labor without compensation by the Nazi regime or its sympathizers or allies to
bring suit against any entity for whom that labor was per-

6

See id.

See generally Byoungwook Park, Comment, Comfort Women During WWII: Are
U.S. Courts a Final Resort for Justice?, 17 Am U Intl L Rev 403, 422-50 (2002) (describing
Joo v Japan,a comfort women case); Harry N. Scheiber, Taking Responsibility: Moral and
HistoricalPerspectives on the Japanese War-ReparationsIssues, 20 Berkeley J Intl L 233
(2002) (describing Japanese cases).
Joo v Japan, 172 F Supp 2d 52 (D DC 2001). See generally Makoto Nishigai, Note,
The Comfort Women Case in the United States: A Note on Questions Resolved and Unresolved in Hwang v Japan, the First Lawsuit Brought by Asian Women Against Japan for
War Crimes, 20 Wis Intl L J 371 (2002).
Joo, 172 F Supp 2d at 64. See also In re World War II Era JapaneseForced Labor
Litigation, 114 F Supp 2d 939, 947-48 (N D Cal 2000) (recounting United States position
against re-opening Japanese reparations questions).
Joo, 172 F Supp 2d at 67.
164 F Supp 2d 1160 (N D Cal 2001), affd as Deutsch v Turner Corp, 317 F3d 1005
(9th Cir 2003), as amended, 2003 US App LEXIS 3937 (9th Cir).
161
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formed."' The various cases filed in federal court were consolidated for pretrial proceedings in the Northern District of California. The court dismissed the actions involving United States and
Allied veterans, ruling that the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Ja"
pan 67
' waived their claims.16 With respect to the non-Allied veterans, the court later found the California statute unconstitutional
as applied to the defendants, because it infringed on the federal
government's exclusive power to conduct foreign affairs. 169 Plaintiffs attempted to assert claims under the ATCA and state law as
well, but the court ruled that all of these claims were time
barred.17
II. ADVANTAGES & DISADVANTAGES OF THE CLASS ACTION
MECHANISM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION

This survey of human rights class actions reveals that they
have an equivocal track record, at best. 7' Only two human rights
class actions have proceeded to judgment: one against a deceased
defendant's estate (Marcos)and one upon the defendant's default
(Karadzic). Not one of the federal class actions against corporations has proceeded past the class certification stage. Courts have
either dismissed the cases outright on jurisdictional or other
grounds, or denied certification. Some of the European historical
" See Cal Code Civ Proc § 354.6 (West 1982 and Supp 2003). The statute also extended the applicable statute of limitations to December 31, 2010. Id at § 354.5. A similar
statute allowed for survivors of the Armenian genocide of 1915 to bring suit against insurers. Id at § 354.4 (1999). In 2001, New York Life Insurance Co. settled a class action lawsuit against it based upon allegations that it failed to honor insurance claims of victims.
See Henry Weinstein, Armenian Genocide Insurance Pact Near, LA Times B1 (Apr 12,

2001).
" Treaty of Peace with Japan, 1952 3 UST 3169, TIAS No 2490 (1951), available
online at <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco0l.htm> (visited September 23,
2003).
" Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F Supp 2d at 942. The same result was

reached with respect to Filipino veterans. See Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F
Supp 2d 1153, 1157 (N D Cal 2001); Jennifer Joseph, Comment, POWs Left in the Cold:
Compensation Eludes American WWII Slave Laborers for Private JapaneseCompanies, 29

Pepp L Rev 209 (2001) (discussing same for American veterans).
109

Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F Supp 2d at 1168. But see Taiheiyo Cement

Corporation v Superior Court, 105 Cal App 4th 398 (2003) (finding California statute
neither preempted nor unconstitutional).
JapaneseForced Labor Litigation, 164 F Supp 2d at 1181-82.

To be sure, it is difficult to compare the success of the relatively few human rights
class actions with other class actions, the majority of which may not achieve certification
or may settle well before trial. Thus, the track record of human rights class actions may
actually be no worse than for other class actions. Nonetheless, human rights class actions
can be evaluated against the relative success obtained in individual human rights actions,
which have consistently resulted in important victories for individual plaintiffs.
"'
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justice cases did succeed in generating monetary restitution for
members of the putative classes, but only as a result of intense
diplomatic efforts and not necessarily to the satisfaction of all
members of the class.
Notwithstanding the mixed results of these prior efforts, new
human rights class actions are filed on a regular basis, especially
against corporate defendants. This indicates that litigants continue to see benefit from proceeding under Rule 23.172 This Part

discusses some of the theoretical advantages presented by the
class action mechanism to human rights litigation. It then discusses the various challenges to class suits that have prevented
the theoretical advantages from full realization and have prevented victims from achieving full satisfaction from the process of
collective action.
A. The Theoretical Advantages Of The Class Action Mechanism
In Human Rights Litigation
Using the Rule 23 mechanism in the human rights context
offers litigants many of the same advantages available in mass
tort, civil rights, and other more standard collective actions.
These include the ability to pool resources to pursue the action;
the ability of plaintiffs to obtain the same "economies of scale"
enjoyed by defendants litigating common issues; the reduction of
discovery, motion practice, and other pretrial procedures; the opportunity for a single judge to familiarize herself with the entire
dispute; the need to litigate defenses only once; the need to obtain
personal jurisdiction over the defendant only once; the ability of
non-named members of the class to avoid exhaustion requirements; the enhanced chance of a global settlement or of receiving
"' Most recently, for example, class actions have been filed in the Eastern District of
New York against Barclays and other corporate defendants under the ATCA alleging that
defendants aided and abetted the apartheid regime in South Africa. See Naomi degli Innocenti & John Reed, The shadow of apartheid, Financial Times (May 18, 2003); available
online at <http://bigclassaction.com/humanrights.html>
(visited September 23, 2003).
Likewise, a class action suit has been filed against Shell Oil in the Southern District of
New York alleging that the company is responsible for abuses by members of the Nigerian
military in Ogoniland, where Shell engages in oil exploration and extraction. See Shell
Oil, available
online
at <http://www.bigclassaction.com/classaction/complaint
_form-shell.html> (visited September 23, 2003). This class action follows on the heels of
an individual action filed against Shell Oil, alleging that the company was complicit in
abuses by the Nigerian government in Ogoniland. See Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co,
1998 US Dist LEXIS 23064, *1-3 (S D NY) (dismissing case on forum non conveniens),
reinstated at 226 F3d 88 (2d Cir 2000). Class actions against corporate defendants will
likely increase as foreign investment by multinationals increases.
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attorneys' fees through the creation of a common fund; and increased visibility for the case.
However, some of the typical rationales for employing the
class action mechanism in other contexts may not operate effectively in the human rights context.7 4 Human rights class actions
do not involve small or "negative value" claims, brought primarily
for their deterrence value, that could not be efficiently litigated as
individual actions. Rather, the claims invariably possess high
individual value. Indeed, human rights claimants who have prevailed in individual actions have won multi-million dollar judgments. 7 ' Likewise, human rights class actions do not generally
consolidate multiple suits that would otherwise proceed independently in different jurisdictions with all of the attendant impacts on judicial efficiency and the potential for contradictory pronouncements. On the other hand, like many class actions, without class treatment, it does not follow that all members of a hypothetical class of human rights victims would pursue individual
suits, because of the many barriers to bringing such suits. In fact,
allowing human rights cases to proceed as class actions may actually result in an increase in the expenditure of judicial resources, because without class treatment the cases may not proceed at all.
This Section identifies certain advantages of class treatment
uniquely significant in the human rights context. Many of the
advantages that class treatment offers human rights claimants
may not be relevant under, or recognized by, the Federal Rules.
Moreover, all of the traditional objectives of the class action
model may not be operative in the human rights context. Yet, the
unique nature of human rights claims and the predicaments and
objectives of human rights claimants lend themselves, at least
" See Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large Numbers of People for Inflicted Harms,
11 Duke J Comp & Intl L 165, 173 (2001) (identifying benefits of the class action model).
,' See generally Koh, 100 Yale L J at 2348-49 (cited in note 2) (noting that transnational public law litigants may sue seeking compensation, redress, deterrence, reform of
national government policies, or judicial articulation of a norm of transnational law); Beth
Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under InternationalLaw: Do Tort Remedies Fit the
Crime?, 60 Alb L Rev 579, 604-05 (1997) (describing the varied objectives of human rights
litigants); Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of
Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42
Harv Intl L J 141, 156-59 (2001) (noting objectives that motivate human rights victims to
bring suit).
"' Most recently, the author was involved in a case in which three plaintiffs won a
$54.6 million jury verdict against two former Ministers of Defense of El Salvador. See
Robert Collier, Floridajury convicts 2 Salvadoran generals of atrocities, San Fran Chron
A12 (July 24, 2002).
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theoretically, to class treatment. When evaluating human rights
class actions, one must consider the role that the class action
mechanism can play in promoting redress for victims and accountability of human rights violators, especially with large-scale
and systemic abuses.
1. A mechanism to expose and redress systemic harms.
The class action mechanism has the potential to give force to
grievances about government or corporate practices and policies
that violate human rights on a collective scale. Adopting an expansive conception of the causes of the harm alleged by members
of the class facilitates the discovery and disclosure of a pattern of
wrongdoing, perhaps not readily apparent from singular or scattered cases. This allows for a more accurate assessment of the
systemic harm done to a group and can potentially generate more
effective remedies to address class-wide injuries,'76 thus ensuring
symmetry between substantive rights and available remedies.'77
Further, the class action device can restore the "balance of
power" between plaintiffs and defendants'7 8 by holding human
rights violators accountable for a fuller range of the harm caused
than an individual action might. Moreover, proceeding as a class
action may generate a powerful deterrent effect. Particularly with
respect to human rights cases against corporations, class treatment may be necessary to create "optimum incentives" for multinational corporations to take due care in arranging for project
security, providing weapons and other materiel to host governments, protecting the environment in which they are operating,
and designing and implementing offshore personnel policies-all
issues that have served as the basis for cases against corporate
entities.'79 Without the threat of aggregative liability and unless
defendants are forced to bear the full costs of the harm caused,
unlawful conduct may remain "profitable."' In this way, collec'T,

David Rosenberg, ClassActions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice By Collec-

tive Means, 62 Ind L J 561, 587-89 (1987).
.. See Three Theories of the ClassAction, 89 Harv L Rev 1329, 1368 (1976).
"'
In re Simon H Litigation, 2002 US Dist LEXIS 25632, *278 (E D NY).
' Boyd, 1999 BYU L Rev at 1210 (cited in note 3) (noting that "[sluch incentives may
deter corporate joint ventures with corrupt governments in mass victimization of plaintiffs' rights under CIL").
'"'

David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection In Mass Exposure Cases: A "PublicLaw"

Vision Of The Tort System, 97 Harv L Rev 851, 906-07 (1984) (noting that critical mass of
victims must prosecute claims in order for responsible institutions to be confronted with
threat of liability powerful enough to invoke deterrence); Developments in the Law, 89
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tive action in response to systemic harms may result in a fuller
realization of the substantive policies underlying applicable international norms.'8'
2. The collective nature of international law claims and
forms of individual responsibility.
The ATCA provides federal courts with jurisdiction over torts
"committed in violation of the law of nations."' 82 This includes
claims arising from the tort analogs of international criminal law
violations (that subset of international law that gives rise to individual criminal responsibility) or arising under the pantheon of
international human rights norms.'83 The definitions of many international criminal law and human rights violations contemplate collective harms, which often differentiate international
from domestic crimes and delicts.'8 4 This may render human
rights claims more amenable to class treatment than the claims
typically advanced in domestic mass tort cases, which are based
on underlying substantive rights that are strongly individual in
character.'
For example, the international offense of crimes against humanity encompasses a constellation of acts made criminal under
international law when committed within a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.' Likewise, genocide
requires a showing that a protected group was subjected to vio-

Harv L Rev at 1355-56 (noting that class actions force defendants to confront the full
social costs of their actions).
" See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stanford L Rev 1183,
1186 (1982) (noting that class actions focus on institutional practices); Amy Laderberg,
The "Dirty Little Secret": Why Class Actions Have Emerged as the Only Viable Option for
Women Inmates Attempting to Satisfy the Subjective Prong of the Eighth Amendment in
Suits for Custodial Sexual Abuse, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev 323, 328 (1998) (noting similar
advantage in civil rights class actions).
"82

28 USC § 1350.

See Filartiga,630 F2d at 882-84 (2d Cir 1980) (canvassing relevant human rights
instruments). The TVPA supports jurisdiction over two international law violations: torture and extrajudicial killing. See Sec 2, Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 USC § 1350.
" See generally Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 Colum J Transnatl L 787 (1999) (discussing the definitional
mechanisms employed in international criminal law to distinguish international from
domestic offenses).
3
I am indebted to Professor Richard Nagareda for this observation.
1
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art 7, UN Doc
"

A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) available online at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/
romefra.htm (visited September 23, 2003) (defining crimes against humanity).
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lent acts, intended by the perpetrator to destroy the group.181
Theoretically, an individual plaintiff can be the victim of a crime
against humanity or genocide. However, because the concepts
themselves contemplate mass or systemic actions against groups,
it may be difficult for both the victim and the jury assessing her
damages to individualize these concepts. Thus, these claims may
be most effectively pled and enforced through collective legal action.
In addition, several international criminal law norms-such
as the prohibitions against genocide, persecution, and crimes
against humanity-are identity based, meaning that they prohibit abuses targeted against particular groups. The crime of
genocide, for example, involves the commission of any number of
acts against a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. 8 ' Invoking these norms in a collective fashion, through the mechanism of
the class action device, provides a forum for groups bound by eth189
nic or cultural characteristics to assert their shared identity.
Groups that may not otherwise benefit from political or other recognition can thus utilize the class action mechanism to engage in
group definition and identification. 9 0 In this regard, several hu' See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art II,
Dec 9, 1948, 78 UNTS 277, 280 (entered into force Jan 12, 1951), available online at
<http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/p-genoci.htm> (visited July 1, 2003) (defining genocide).
'" Article II of the Genocide Convention reads in full:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical [sic], racial or religious group, as
such:

(a)

Killing members of the group;

(b)

Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c)
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d)

Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e)

Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Id. The notion of a "national" group has been interpreted to encompass national minorities. See William A. Schabas, Genocide in InternationalLaw: the Crimes of Crimes 116-18
(Cambridge 2000).
Boyd, 1999 BYU L Rev at 1178 (cited in note 3).
" See Chibundu, 39 Va J Intl L at 1109 (cited in note 6) (noting that the class action
device is an effective litigation tool where it is "Wielded not to vindicate the aggregate of
otherwise individualized interests, but [to exemplify] ideological group interests").
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man rights class actions have involved allegations, by indigenous
or other minority groups, that corporate practices are destroying
the groups' unique cultural characteristics and ability to maintain their traditional relationships with the land. 91
Human rights law contemplates three "generations" of rights:
civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and
collective rights of groups, encompassing rights of political, cultural, economic, and social self-determination and development.' 9
Many cases against corporate defendants have involved allegations that a corporate entity, or a government engaged in a joint
venture with a corporate defendant, violated the "third generation of human rights" of indigenous or minority groups.193 In such
cases, the litigant is often conceived of as the group itself, in
94
keeping with the entity model of class representation.

"9 See, for example, Aguinda v Texaco, Inc, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 4718 (S D NY) (ac-

tion on behalf of indigenous Amazon people alleging destruction of tropical rainforest
habitat); Beanal v Freeport-McMoRan, Inc, 969 F Supp 362, 366 (E D La 1997) (alleging
the commission of "cultural genocide").
" See generally Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, 6 Hum Rts Q 257, 264-67 (1984)
(noting schools of thought in each generation). See also Ruti Teitel, Human Rights Genealogy, 66 Fordham L Rev 301 (1997) (recounting three generations of rights). The first
generation of rights has its roots in liberal notions of the inherent dignity of human person
and was codified in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id at 311; see
999 UNTS 171 (1966) available online at <http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/a/ccpr.htm>
(visited July 1, 2003). The second generation of rights reflects a socialist tradition and is
set forth in the more aspirational International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 993 UNTS 3 (1966) available online at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/bla-cescr.htm> (visited July 1, 2003). The notion of collective rights emerged later
in the development of international human rights norms and traces its philosophical underpinnings to communitarianism. Weston, 6 Hum Rts Q at 264-66. See, for example,
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Banjul Charter), 21 ILM 58 (1992);
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 34 ILM 351, Art 1 (1995)
("The protection of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging
to those minorities forms an integral part of the international protection of human rights,
and as such falls within the scope of international co-operation.").
"' See generally Boyd, 1999 BYU L Rev at 1169 (cited in note 3) ("Judicial recognition
of collective private rights under [customary international law], through class certification
and implementation of class remedies, enables individuals to exercise rights that, due to
costs, they would not otherwise enjoy.").
" See David L. Shapiro, ClassActions: The Class as Partyand Client, 73 Notre Dame

L Rev 913, 919 (1998). See also Boyd, 1999 BYU L Rev at 1183 (cited in note 3) (noting
that the entity model "fits the human rights case in which the litigant is a cohesive group
possessing collective rights"). But see Chibundu, 39 Va J Intl L at 1109 (cited in note 6)
(noting that the class action model allows the vindication of individual interests, not group
interests); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, And
Loyalty In Representative Litigation, 100 Colum L Rev 370, 380-85 (2000) (arguing that

class actions seeking money damages constitute an aggregation of individuals holding
similar claims against common defendants rather than an entity distinct from its members).
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Litigants and lawyers involved in these cases have theorized
that the class action mechanism could serve a constitutive function in the formation of international law'95 by enabling the judicial enforcement of these collective rights, which have heretofore
had an "ambiguous jural status" in international law.196 Through
the class action, plaintiffs have advanced claims of cultural genocide and environmental torts, which have not been enforced or
adjudicated in prior domestic proceedings under the ATCA.'97 For
the most part, however, these efforts have not enjoyed success, as
courts have ruled that the norms in question have not risen to the
level of "torts... in violation of the law of nations" as required by
the ATCA.'98 For example, the putative class in Beanal v Freeport-McMoRan, Inc'99 alleged that the defendant mining company
committed cultural genocide, various human rights abuses, and
environmental torts that destroyed an Indonesian indigenous
group's unique cultural identity and its ability to sustain itself
and its cultural practices.2 ° The district court held"0 ' and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed0 2 that claims of cultural genocide and environmental harm ,were not cognizable under the ATCA, because
they were not sufficiently definable, universal, or obligatory to
constitute violations of the law of nations.0 3 That said, as these
norms become the subject of more binding pronouncements and
more concrete definitions, they may receive a better reception
under ATCA jurisprudence.2 '
" See Geoffrey B. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device upon the Substantive

Law, 58 FRD 307, 307 (1973) (noting that "[slubstantive law is shaped and articulated by
procedural possibilities").
Id.

Boyd, 1999 BYU L Rev at 1147 (cited in note 3) (arguing that the judicial pronouncement of class definitions provide a means of developing new substantive international law norms); id at 1172-73 (opining that the class action device provides a mechanism for defining and enforcing collective rights).
198 28 USC § 1350. See generally Joanna E. Arlow, Note, The
Utility of ATCA and the
117

"Law of Nations" in Environmental Torts Litigation: Jota v Texaco, Inc. and Large Scale

Environmental Destruction, 7 Wis Envir L J 93 (2000) (discussing problems with environmental tort cases); John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined
Human Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary InternationalLaw,

25 Colum J Envtl L 283 (2000) (setting forth theory of cognizable environmental torts).
969 F Supp 362 (E D La 1997).
Id at 373, 382.
2

Id at 373.
Beanal v Freeport-McMoRan,Inc, 197 F3d 161, 168 (5th Cir 1999).

Id at 167-68.
See Lyndsy Rutherford, Note, Redressing U.S. Corporate Environmental Harms
Abroad Through TransnationalPublic Law Litigation: Generating a Global Discourse on
the InternationalDefinition of Environmental Justice, 14 Geo Intl Envtl L Rev 807, 834-

35 (2002).
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Forms of responsibility recognized by international law also
lend themselves to the class action model. For example, the Marcos and Karadzic cases proceeded under the theory of command
responsibility, which provides that a military or civilian superior
can be liable for the criminal acts of subordinates if the superior
knew or should have known that subordinates committed abuses
and failed to either prevent or punish the criminal conduct.20 5 The
class action device allows a class of victims to hold a defendant
commander liable for all abuses by his subordinates attributable
to his derelictions of command.
3. The opportunity to bear witness to and record a community's stories.
Human rights victims and advocates assert the existence of a
"right" to truth. Accordingly, human rights claimants may
seek
the creation of a public historical record of the harm caused to a
particular region or population as a result of a repressive course
of conduct. Litigation allows a group of victims to preserve their
collective memory through the public airing and recording of the
stories of a community of victims." 6 The right of a class to seek
declaratory relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) in the form of a court
acknowledgement that particular rights were violated on a collective scale provides a mechanism for formalizing a judicial determination in this regard.0 7
Given the collective nature of international law norms and
forms of responsibility, proceeding as a class action allows class
plaintiffs to seek the discovery and introduction of a broader
range of evidence that may more accurately reflect the nature of
the repression suffered under a particular regime or at the hands
of a particular individual. Such broad discovery aids in creating a
more accurate and complete historical and judicial record. 8
' See Ford v Garcia, 289 F3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir 2002) (discussing the elements of
liability under the command responsibility doctrine).
" See Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 Mich L
Rev 2031, 2102 (1998) (noting psychological benefits of civil suits to victims); Sharon K
Hom and Eric K Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History and Social Justice, 47 UCLA L
Rev 1747, 1771-76 (2000) (discussing collective memory effect of Rice v Cayetano).
See, for example, PresbyterianChurch of Sudan v Talisman Energy, Complaint at
27 (S D NY Feb 25, 2002) (seeking declaration that defendants "violated international law
in connection with their oil exploration and drilling activities in Sudan, or has aided and
abetted therein").
See Rosenberg, 62 Ind L J at 587 (cited in note 176) (noting that the class action
mechanism encourages courts to look to systemic, class wide nature of the challenged
conduct, which may be lost to "Uludicial myopia" where independent claimants proceed in
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Without the rubric of the class action, courts may resist the introduction of such evidence as redundant, irrelevant, or overly
prejudicial to the defendant if it does not relate directly to the
dispute between the two parties at bar. °9
4. A vehicle for class-wide injunctive or other equitable relief
The most obvious objective of a civil case brought by victims
of human rights violations-whether as an individual suit or as a
class action-is to secure a monetary judgment, recognizing,
however, that a victim of grave human rights violations may
never receive full compensation for the harm suffered. Beyond
compensation for past harms, human rights claimants may also
seek injunctive relief, 1 ' including changes in corporate policies or
implementation of remedial measures,21' such as an environseparate actions); 89 Harv L Rev at 1368 (cited in note 180) (noting that the class action
device "assists the court in seeing ...the generality of the challenged discriminatory practice that makes structural relief appropriate in the first place").
See FRE 403 (excluding evidence where its introduction would lead to "unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues ... undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence"). That said, in individual cases involving crimes against humanity
or command responsibility allegations, such evidence may be admissible for the purpose of
either establishing one of the elements of crimes against humanity (for example, the existence of an attack on a civilian population) or to establish notice on the part of the defendant. For example, in Romagoza v Garcia, plaintiffs were permitted to introduce expert
and other testimony about the nature and extent of repression against civilians in El
Salvador in the early 1980s in order to show that (1) defendants knew, or should have
known, that subordinates were committing abuses; (2) that they failed to intervene to
prevent or punish this criminal conduct; and (3) that there were patterns to the violence,
which implied organization from the top rather than random abuses by subordinates. The
court admitted voluminous evidence in this regard, prefacing it with limiting instructions
to the jury as to the purposes for which such evidence was admitted. See, for example,
Romagoza v Garcia, Trial Transcript, at 740:18 - 742:7 (S D F1 July 2, 2002) (allowing the
introduction of evidence relevant to whether defendants were on notice of abuses) (on file
with U Chi Legal F).
"' See generally Sarah Light, Note, The Human Rights Injunction: Equitable Remedies Under the Alien Tort ClaimsAct, 9 Transnatl L & Contemp Probs 653 (1999) (discussing cases in which injunctive relief in the human rights context may be appropriate, notwithstanding concerns stemming from extraterritorial effect, such as doctrine of international comity and challenges related to enforcement).
2. Several human rights class actions against corporate defendants have sought such
equitable relief from corporate conduct and policies allegedly harming the plaintiff group.
For example, plaintiffs in Aguinda sought equitable relief against Texaco in the form
of undertaking or financing environmental cleanup, to include access to potable water and hunting and fishing grounds, renovating or closing the TransEcuadoran Pipeline, creation of an environmental monitoring fund, formulating standards to govern future Texaco oil development, creation of a medical
monitoring fund, an injunction restraining Texaco from entering into activities that run a high risk of environmental or human injuries, and restitution.
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mental cleanup or medical monitoring.2 1 Likewise, human rights
claimants may seek, via declaratory relief, a public and judicial
acknowledgement of the violation of particular rights and the illegality of a particular course of conduct.
The Federal Rules recognize the propriety of seeking such
relief through legal proceedings involving all individuals who will
be impacted by the relief sought.2 13 Specifically, Rule 23(b)(2) allows for class treatment if "the party opposing the class has acted
or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole."1 4 This
Rule was designed specifically for civil rights cases "seeking
broad declaratory or injunctive relief for a numerous and often
unascertainable or amorphous class of persons."1 To obtain this
relief, the putative class must demonstrate that "the interests of
the class members are so like those of the individual representatives that injustice will not result from their being bound by such
judgment in the subsequent application of principles of res judicata.,,1 6
Such cases rest on allegations that the defendant's conduct is
common to all class members "irrespective of their individual cir2 7 Rather
cumstances and the disparate effects of the conduct.""
than aggregating individual claims, mandatory Rule 23(b)(2)
class actions involve claims that belong to the collectivity. Thus, a
Rule 23(b)(2) class may be appropriate where a human rights
Jota v Texaco, Inc, 157 F3d 153, 156 n 2 (2d Cir 1998) (discussing Aguinda). Conceivably,
a plaintiff class could seek equitable relief against an individual defendant in a command
responsibility case; however, it is difficult to conceive of how such relief would be enforced.
See Kadic v Karadzic, Complaint, at 19 (seeking to enjoin defendant from "permitting to
occur under his command, any genocidal acts or 'ethnic cleansing'") (on file with U Chi
Legal F).
" Although the question is not entirely settled, medical monitoring may be best conceived of as a form of prospective injunctive relief, rather than as retrospective compensatory payments for realized harms. See John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Unrealized Torts, 88 Va L Rev 1625, 1709-12 (2002) (discussing medical monitoring and
the duty to aid the imperiled); Barnes v American Tobacco Co, 161 F3d 127, 132, 142 (3d
Cir 1998) (treating medical monitoring as a form of injunctive relief).
...See Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class
Actions, 77 Notre Dame L Rev 1057, 1058-59 (2002) (describing cases in which no individual litigant will have "an autonomous right to an independent outcome in the litigation").
.. FRCP 23(b)(2).
.. Herbert B. Newberg and Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 4.11 at 4-39
(Shepard's/McGraw-Hill 3d ed 1992).
216 Hassine v Jeffes, 846 F2d 169, 179 (3d Cir 1988).
27 Baby Neal for and by Kanter v Casey, 43 F3d 48, 57 (3d Cir 1994) (citing 7A Wright
§ 1763 at 219).
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class's interests are cohesive and indivisible, the relief sought
would be undermined if members of the class were allowed to opt
out or pursue separate actions, the defendant could otherwise be
subject to conflicting directives concerning its conduct, or individual litigants with extreme positions may seek relief that would be
unwelcome to other members of the group." 8 Further, Rule
23(b)(2) class actions do not raise issues of predominance, manageability, and representation, which would be the case if members of the class were to seek individualized, intangible and retroactive damage awards based upon the merits of individual
claims and proof of actual injury. 29 Thus, Rule 23(b)(2) enables
the class to proceed collectively even where the individual circumstances of class members may predominate over common issues, which would render certification under Rule 23(b)(3) unavailable.22
Assuming that class representatives and class counsel take
their fiduciary responsibilities seriously, pursuing injunctive relief for the class provides a democratic aspect to a suit and ensures that the relief sought is desired by those who will be impacted by it. Such relief will only be authorized, however, where
the entity before the court is capable of effectuating it.22 ' Thus,
injunctive relief will only be appropriate where a corporate defendant possesses the ability to remedy the harm to the plaintiff
See Robinson v Metro-North Commuter R R Co, 267 F3d 147, 165 (2d Cir 2001)
("Where class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief is sought in a (b)(2) class action for an
alleged group harm, there is a presumption of cohesion and unity between absent class
members and the class representatives such that adequate representation will generally
safeguard absent class members' interests and thereby satisfy the strictures of due process.").
218

1' Issacharoff, 77 Notre Dame L Rev at 1073 (cited in note 213). For example, where a
plaintiff class seeks medical monitoring, all plaintiffs stand in the same relation toward
the claim, because they are each subject to the same probabilistic risk of harm. Id at 1076.
' See Allison v Citgo Petroleum Corp, 151 F3d 402 (5th Cir 1998) (denying certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because the predominant relief sought was money damages, and
Rule 23(b)(3), because claims for compensatory and punitive damages predominated over
common issues). Monetary damages may be available in the context of Rule 23(b)(2) class
actions where such relief is essentially a group remedy incidental to the injunctive relief
sought, which is to say that it flows directly from a finding of a defendant's liability to the
class as a whole. Id at 413-15. For example, in the employment discrimination context,
courts may consider backpay an integral part of the remedial remedy provided by the

relevant statutes. See Johnson v Georgia Highway Express, Inc, 417 F2d 1122, 1125 (5th
Cir 1969); Issacharoff, 77 Notre Dame L Rev at 1069 n 59 (noting different approaches to
the award of damages in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions) (cited in note 213).
221 See, for example, Unocal, 67 F Supp 2d at 1146. But see Jota v Texaco,
Inc, 157 F3d
153, 161-162 (2d Cir. 1998), vacating sub nom Aguinda v Texaco, Inc, 945 F Supp. 625
(SD N Y 1996) (ordering district court to consider equitable relief notwithstanding inability to join state petroleum agency).
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class, through, for instance, environmental cleanup or medical
monitoring.22 2 The flexibility inherent to proceeding in equity can
enable a court to fashion a remedial scheme that will ameliorate
specific harms alleged by the claimants, even if complete relief
cannot be obtained.223 Such relief may "more effectively influence
behavior than damage awards" and may better address ongoing
harms.22
Equitable relief may also be appropriate in situations where
a plaintiff's claims could potentially be declared moot due to
changed circumstances.2 5 For example, where a plaintiff has become a refugee and is no longer subject to a repressive regime or
policy, it may be difficult to demonstrate the credible threat of
recurring injury necessary to seek injunctive relief.26 Where a
class seeks injunctive relief, the court focuses on the standing of
the class to seek the equitable relief desired, rather than the
standing of the named plaintiff.2 27 Thus, even if the named plaintiff's claim to injunctive relief is subsequently found moot, the
claims of the class to the desired relief survive.28
5. A basis for negotiation.
Class members may use litigation and any judicial pronouncements as "bargaining chips" in seeking a negotiated solution or structural reform. The class action device places victims of
human rights abuses in a powerful litigation posture that may
enable the class to operate on a corporate or diplomatic level with
a degree of political power generally unavailable to individual
claimants. For example, the Marcos jury award factored into the
negotiations between the Swiss banks holding Marcos's assets
and the new government of the Republic of the Philippines.2 2 9 The
See, for example, Aguinda, 850 F Supp at 283 (seeking the establishment of a medical program and environmental remedies in Ecuador).
Jota, 157 F3d at 162 (noting that "an injunction might require Texaco to make good

faith efforts to institute all, or at least portions, of the relief that the plaintiffs seek").
Light, 9 Transnatl L & Contemp Probs at 657 (cited in note 210).

See, for example, Los Angeles v Lyons, 461 US 95, 110 (1983) (holding that plaintiff

had no standing to seek injunctive relief because he did not face "a real and immediate

threat of again being illegally choked").
'

But see Doe v Unocal Corp, 67 F Supp 2d 1140, 1143-44 (C D Cal 1999) (finding

that a credible threat of future harm had been alleged where plaintiffs, who were all refugees in Thailand, might be forcibly repatriated to Burma either by attacks by the SLORC
on refugee camps or as a result of Thai refoulement actions).
See, for example, LaDuke v Nelson, 762 F2d 1318, 1325 (9th Cir 1985).
Id.
'"

See note 33.
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Swiss banks ultimately agreed to transfer the funds to the Philippines, but a Filipino court, facing objections from members of
the class, rejected the settlement because230it benefited the lawyers
and Marcos's Estate, but not the victims.

Likewise, the European WWII class action proceedings in
many respects galvanized the diplomatic and intergovernmental
efforts that eventually led to the establishment of several European and industry investigative, claims, and compensation commissions and tribunals, and the negotiation of broad settlements.2 3' Thus, the class action suits became an arrow in the

quiver of the WWII restitution movement that included municipal sanctions, boycotts, and governmental pressure. This movement provided an incentive for German, Swiss, and other national entities to recognize their moral debt to the victim classes,
even when the plaintiffs' legal claims were tenuous because of the
passage of time and complicated problems of proof. This result is
not inevitable; the European WWII cases achieved what they did
through a complex interplay of law, diplomacy, and politics. By
contrast, the Japanese WWII class actions have been vigorously
defended and have been unable to motivate the degree of political
will required to effectuate settlements or restitution schemes
comparable to those achieved in the European cases.232
From the perspective of the accused individual or entity, all
class actions potentially "blackmail" a settlement of even unmeritorious claims. From the defendant's perspective the potential
exposure of a class action presents too great of a risk. 33 Putting
aside the historical justice cases, settlement-strictly speaking131

See note 53.

"' See Bazyler, 25 Fordham Intl L J at 90-91 (cited in note 120) (noting the effectiveness of trade threats in encouraging European enterprises to settle); Authers and Wolffe,
The Victim's Fortune219 (cited in note 118) (noting opinion that the cases were being used
as a "matrix for a larger negotiation").
"32See, for example, Joo v Japan, 172 F Supp 2d 52, 55 n 1 (D DC 2001) (dismissing
suit on behalf of "comfort women" on grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to Japan's foreign
sovereign immunity); In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F
Supp 2d 939, 947-48 (N D Cal 2000) (dismissing case as an interference with U.S. foreign
policy). See also Scheiber, 20 Berkeley J Intl L at 233-35 (cited in note 161). (describing
Japanese intransigence to taking responsibility for WWII atrocities).
...See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir 1995); Castano v
American Tobacco Co, 84 F3d 734, 746 (5th Cir 1996) (noting certification "creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle"); Richard 0. Faulk, Armageddon Through
Aggregation? The Use and Abuse of Class Actions in InternationalDispute Resolution, 10
MSU-DCL J Intl L 205 (2001) (cited in note 7). But see Charles Silver, We're Scared To
Death: Does Class Certification Subject Defendants To Blackmail?, NYU L Rev (October
2003) (debunking blackmail thesis in class action context).
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has rarely occurred in the human rights context. In the first generation of cases against individual perpetrators inaugurated by
234 defendants
Filartiga,
usually contested the jurisdiction of the
court and fled the United States immediately following service of
process or after losing an initial round of motions to dismiss, resulting in a series of default judgments.235 Where defendants have
not fled, they have defended the action through trial, as in Ford v
Garcia and Romagoza v Garcia."'
The possibility of settlement-and thus of a coerced settlement-may be more likely in cases against corporate defendants,
who cannot flee and who may face significant public relations
pressures. Nevertheless, corporate defendants thus far have vigorously defended human rights suits and, in many cases, have
obtained dismissals.237 The Unocal case, in which a panel of the
Ninth Circuit recently reversed summary judgment on behalf of
Unocal,238 may provide the first opportunity for a real possibility
of settlement, depending upon the outcome of the full circuit's
review of the case.
6. The lack of other options for redress.
A community of human rights victims may find proceeding as
a class desirable because representative justice may provide the
only possible justice for victims of a particular policy or individual.239 Substantial barriers exist for human rights plaintiffs pur630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
See, for example, Mushikiwabo v Barayagwiza, 1996
US Dist LEXIS 4409, *6 (S D
NY) (noting defendant's claim to immunity and refusal to submit to the jurisdiction
of the
court). See also Perl, 88 Georgetown L J at 794 (cited in note 7) (noting that former
government officials in ATCA/TVPA cases have no incentive to settle because they are
confident any award will not be enforced against them).
Ford v Garcia, 289 F3d 1283 (11th Cir 2002), was a command responsibility case
against two former Salvadoran officials residing in Florida on behalf of the families of
four
American churchwomen raped and murdered in El Salvador in 1980. Id at 1286.
Ford
resulted in a defendants' verdict. See id at 1292 (upholding jury instructions which
led to
judgment for defendants at district court). A companion case filed against the same
two
defendants, Romagoza v Garcia, resulted in a $54.6 million judgment for the plaintiffs.
Romagoza v Garcia, Final Judgment (July 31, 2002) (on file with U Chi Legal
F). The
author served on the trial team of the Romagoza case. In addition to the two Salvadoran
cases, the Marcos case is so far the only other ATCAfIVPA case that proceeded to
trial
without a default.
" See, for example, Bao Ge v Li Peng, 201 F Supp 2d 14 (D Col 2000) (dismissing case
against Adidas for lack of state action).
Doe v Unocal Corp, 2002 US App LEXIS 19263, *3 (9th Cir), rehearing en banc
granted by Doe v Unocal Corp, 2003 US App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir).
' At the same time, although proceeding as a class allows all victims of a particular
policy to be part of a legal process, it should be noted that individual human rights actions
23
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suing justice independently. Victims often lack the resources necessary to pursue a claim or lack access to lawyers or to courts
able to hear their claims. It may be difficult for multiple plaintiffs
to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant on more than
one occasion. 24 ° Human rights plaintiffs may also lack a basic

knowledge of their legal rights under international law.24' Class
actions allow individuals who may fear violent retaliation
(against themselves or their loved ones) to participate in the legal
process, without having to assume a public or prominent role in
the litigation.242 Accordingly, in certain contexts, class treatment
may provide the only feasible method of adjudication for the victims of human rights abuses.243
For example, at the time the Marcos case was filed, Philippine law required a defendant to be served in the situs for a case
to proceed. Once Marcos fled to Hawaii, his victims could not obtain justice in the Philippines. Allowing victims based in the Philippines to participate in the class action in U.S. courts ensured
that they received some measure of justice. 44 Likewise, in
Karadzic, it was unlikely that any additional victims could have
obtained personal jurisdiction over the defendant after he was
served by the Doe and Kadic plaintiffs in New York. He was only

have a representational component as well. Many individual plaintiffs feel that they are
standing in for the hundreds or thousands of other victims who could not join the suit, and
other victims have said that they achieved a sense of justice through these exemplary
cases. See, for example, Arkansas Ed Assoc v Bd of Ed of Portland,Ark School Dist, 446
F2d 763, 765 (8th Cir 1971).
24' See Perl, 88 Georgetown L J at 789 (cited in note 7) (noting that proceeding as a
class action "enables all the claims of the entire class to proceed while only requiring that
the defendant be properly served once").
"' See Chandler v Southwest Jeep-Eagle,Inc, 162 FRD 302, 310 (N D Ill 1995) (a class
action protects the rights of consumers who may be unaware of statutory protection).
..
2 See, for example, Mullen v Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F3d 620, 625 (5th Cir
1999) (finding joinder impracticable and thus numerosity requirement satisfied where
plaintiffs still employed by defendant feared workplace retaliation). The identity of class
members can remain under seal if issues of confidentiality are at issue. See Doe v Advanced Textile Corp, 214 F3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir 2000) (holding that plaintiffs may sue
anonymously in Fair Labor Standards Act collective action where plaintiffs feared retaliation).
4' In general, the various international human rights institutions do not entertain
collective action by victims of human rights abuses. See William J. Aceves, Actio Popularis? The Class Action in InternationalLaw, 2003 U Chi Legal F 253.
244 See Ellen L. Lutz, The Marcos Human Rights Litigation: Can Justice be Achieved in
U.S. Courts for Abuses that Occurred Abroad?, 14 B C Third World L J 43, 45 (1994). At
the time the case was filed, Marcos had already fled the Philippines and the new president, Corazon Aquino, refused to allow his repatriation. Id.
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in the United States to attend meetings at the United Nations
and to fundraise throughout the Serbian expatriate community.245
B. The Disadvantages Of, And Challenges To, Using The Class
Mechanism In The Human Rights Context
Notwithstanding the appeal of the class action in the human
rights context, a number of disadvantages and challenges to using the class mechanism exist.
1. A compromise to claim autonomy.
Human rights class actions invoke the same tension between
collective justice and individual autonomy that characterize all
class actions."' Although class actions routinely proceed in the
personal injury and mass tort contexts, the Advisory Committee's
notes to Rule 23 indicate that this approach is disfavored. 47 Such
reluctance stems in part from the ideal of each plaintiff having
his "day in court" in cases involving grave physical harm, and few
claims are as personal as torture or cruel treatment. Victims of
human rights abuses, like all victims, value having a personal
..
5 Indeed, in their motion to certify the class, the Doe plaintiffs noted that most class
members would not be able to bring individual actions against Karadzic and thus would
achieve no justice at all if they were not given representative access to the court through
the class. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Certify Class at 13
(SD NY July 3, 1997) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
' Steinhardt, 20 Yale J Intl L at 93 (cited in note 1) ("A mass human rights tort trial
inevitably compromises claim autonomy.").
..
7 See 1966 Amendments, Advisory Committee Notes, 39 FRD 69, 103:
A 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily
not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these
circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.
See also Castano, 84 F3d at 746 n 23 (noting that courts are hesitant to certify mass torts
class actions outside of the single disaster context). However, at least one of the drafters of
this note has backed off this position. See Herbert B. Newburg, Newberg on Class Actions
§ 17.06 at 373 (Shepard's/McGraw-Hill 2d ed 1985) (quoting Professor Charles Allen
Wright):
I was an ex-officio member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
when Rule 23 was amended, which came out with an advisory committee
note saying that mass torts are inappropriate for class certification. I
thought then that was true. I am profoundly convinced now that that is
untrue. Unless we can use the class action and devices built on the class
action, our judicial system is not going to be able to cope with the challenges of the mass repetitive wrong.
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relationship with an advocate and participating directly in a legal
process, rather than accessing the legal system through a representative who may be inaccessible or unresponsive to the particulars of an individual plaintiff's case.24 Adopting a leading role in
the litigation enables a plaintiff to commence, frame, and pursue
the litigation in accordance with his own interests. Without the
4 9 a class action
opportunity to experience these "process values,""
may deny victims the full rehabilitative potential of litigation and
the sense of satisfaction resulting from the process and the judgment. At the extreme, it may even create a sense of being kidnapped by the legal process.
Nevertheless, class-wide injunctive relief, more optimal levels of deterrence, the articulation and affirmation of legal norms,
disgorgement of profits, and obtaining some form of corrective
justice may provide significant benefits to members of the class,
despite the lack of individual participation. Especially when the
option of individual justice does not exist as a practical matter, a
collective process and class-wide relief may be better than no
process or no relief at all.251
Furthermore, the procedural safeguards associated with the
certification of voluntary classes under Rule 23(b)(3) mitigate to
some degree concerns about claim autonomy. Prior to the Ortiz
ruling,252 some advocates argued that human rights class actions
250

"' See Chibundu, 39 Va J Intl L at 1106 (cited in note 6) (questioning whether participation as a member of a class of human rights victims provides the same degree of catharsis and closure as an individual action). See id at 1108 ("... it is hard to imagine how the
class victim thousands of miles away from U.S. shores and with at most the dimmest
conception of the complicated proceedings that go on in American courthouses can possibly
share a sense of justice from those proceedings.").
..
' See Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for
"Process Values", 60 Cornell L Rev 1, 3 (1974) (defining "process values" as "standards of
value by which we may judge a legal process to be good as a process, apart from any 'good
result efficacy' it may have").
" See MacKinnon, 6 ILSA J Intl & Comp L at 573 (cited in note 7):
Unsought and unwanted representation in a class raises the possibility
that some of the intangible and expressive gains from human rights litigation . . . may be undermined. . . . Being forcibly lumped into a groupbased class, thereby deprived of direct or actual representation, being
represented in name (or no name) only, survivors of group-based atrocities can experience the process as furthering the deprivation of humanity
that human rights law promises to restore.
"5 In the words of one class action attorney, we "should not allow the perfect to be the
enemy of the good." Conversation with Elisabeth Cabraser (Nov 2, 2002). See In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F Supp 278, 282 (D C NY 1971) (rejecting defendants' argument
that "no remedy is better than an imperfect one").
...See note 75.
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involving the assertion of collective rights should proceed exclusively as mandatory class actions under Rule 23(b)(1), even where
money damages were sought. 53 The theory was that allowing individual members of the class to opt out of the class at will would
undermine the substantive interests of the class. 254 This reasoning failed to acknowledge the potential for intra-class conflicts
and agency costs in the human rights context and presumed that
all members of a human rights class have equal interests in the
litigation-assumptions not born out in practice.5 Preserving the
right of plaintiffs to assert their claims individually, or to opt out
of a human rights class, engenders a sense of empowerment and
reflects the fact that the human rights edifice has at its base the
promotion of human dignity, which is undermined when individuals are forced into a judicial process they do not support.
2. The impact of proceeding as a class on other
aspects of the case.
Although not expressed in the case law, the fact that a case
was commenced as a putative class action impacts court rulings
on pre-trial motions from defendants seeking dismissal, for instance, on justiciability or via abstention doctrines, even where
defendants assert these defenses well before the initiation of class
certification. 56 For example, the two class actions filed against
Texaco alleging environmental harms in Ecuador and Peru were
dismissed prior to certification on grounds of international comSee Boyd, 1999 BYU L Rev at 1207 (cited in note 3):
In general, procedures such as opt out and notice designed to preserve individual autonomy are less compelling in the adjudication of collective
human rights where shared interests are a prerequisite to the collective
rights claims. Moreover, when balanced with considerations of corporate
deterrence of human rights abuses through group remedies, a policy toward disallowing opt out rights is justified.
Id at 1183-86, 1206 n 327 ("[The attempts in Karadzic and the Swiss Bank Settlement] to opt out illustrate the possible harmful effects of unlimited opt out rights.").
See, for example, Doe v Karadzic, 182 FRD 424, 428 (S D NY 1998) (denying the
Kadic plaintiffs' motion to opt out of mandatory class).
"5 Courts may not consider the likelihood of success on the merits of the suit when
ruling on certification motions, Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156, 172 (1974) (eschewing the authority "to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order
to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action"), although they may inquire
into the merits of the suit to ensure that Rule 23's certification requirements are met.
Szabo v Bridgeport Machs, Inc, 249 F3d 672, 675-77 (7th Cir 2001). Although the concern
identified by this sub-section is a different one, it is related in that it criticizes the premature consideration of class certification issues in the determination of affirmative defenses
available to the defendant.
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ity, forum non conveniens, and the failure to join indispensable
parties, such as Ecuador and the state-owned petroleum company
involved in the pipeline project." 7 The Aguinda court's forum non
conveniens analysis identified a number of impediments to conducting the litigation on behalf of thousands of inaccessible indigenous persons who spoke a myriad of languages."' Class aspects of the case impacted the court's forum non conveniens
analysis long before it had reached a decision, or even considered
briefing, on class certification.
Likewise, class actions alleging widespread government
abuses likely impact U.S. foreign policy more than individual actions, and thus render these cases more vulnerable to dismissal
on political question grounds." In re Assicurazioni Generali,26 a
WWII case against an Italian insurance company, suggests a better approach. In Assicurazioni, the court deferred ruling on
whether European courts could provide an adequate forum until
after the plaintiffs had precisely defined the class.261
3. Threats of collusion.
Like in all class actions, "collusion" between class counsel
and defendant's counsel, between class representatives and class
counsel, between defendant's counsel and class representatives,
and between counsel and the court can taint human rights class
actions. These risks were perhaps less acute in the first generation of human rights cases, which were individual actions
brought by pro bono lawyers who were part of the so-called "human rights movement." However, human rights cases are no
longer the exclusive province of non-profit human rights lawyers,"' especially since the advent of cases against corporate entities and the development of an established body of jurisprudence.
As a result, tactics observed in traditional class actions, including
sweetheart settlements, reverse auctions for class counsel, using
the res judicata effects of the class mechanism to limit the scope
of a defendant's liability in the event of a proliferation-or feared
See Aguinda v Texaco, Inc, 945 F Supp 625 (S D NY 1996).
See Aguinda, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 4718, at *4-5.
See, for example, Sarei v Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F Supp 2d 1116, 1195-99 (C D Cal
2002).
228 F Supp 2d 348 (S D NY 2002).
Id at 364.
2
The variety of counsel bringing such cases belies arguments by some that human
rights cases are brought by activist or advocacy groups for purely political purposes. See
Chibundu, 39 Va J Intl L at 1104 (cited in note 6).
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proliferation--of individual actions, or attempts to "decapitate" a
class by reaching a side settlement with class representatives,
have entered into human rights litigation.2 63 Indeed, as in other
contexts, entrepreneurial attorneys may increasingly initiate
human rights class actions and then troll for a handful of representative clients, diluting the idea of a party plaintiff and the
classical model of individual client control.264
Allegations of collusion amongst, and stated dissatisfaction
with, plaintiffs' counsel have already tainted human rights class
actions.2 65 For example, there were substantial objections among
the plaintiff class members and class representatives to the Marcos settlement, which, although approved by the district court
judge, was ultimately rejected by a Filipino court partially because of affidavits filed by dissenters.2 6 Victims objected to the
fact that the settlement agreement denied all liability on the part
of Marcos and his family members. In the victims' eyes, this provision denigrated the victims' experiences and negated the jury's
judgment. Some plaintiffs also believed that the settlement represented a mere fraction of the compensatory award that the jury
had granted them and awarded too large a percentage of the settlement to the plaintiffs' attorneys.26 7
Similarly, named plaintiffs and victims' organizations in
many of the WWII class actions have publicly and vocally withdrawn from the settlement agreements obtained in those cases,
partially because too much of the settlement fund went to the
class action lawyers.2 8 Although many of the attorneys working

See generally Bruce Hay and David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail"Settlements In Class Actions: Reality And Remedy, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 1377 (2000); G.
Donald Puckett, Note, Peering into a Black Box: Discovery and Adequate Attorney Representation for Class Action Settlements, 77 Tex L Rev 1271 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Colum L Rev 1343, 1354, 1371-73
(1995).
' See Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private
Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 Val U L Rev 413, 435 (1999). See also 1-800-LAWSUIT, available online at <http://1800-law-suit.com> (visited September 23, 2003) (soliciting plaintiffs for class actions).
'
See note 84 (noting problems with plaintiffs' counsel in Beanal). See also Doe v
Karadzic, 192 FRD 133, 138 n 8 (S D NY 2000) (discussing allegations of collusion by
plaintiffs' counsel).
See note 53.
See note 49 (filing by dissenters to Marcos settlement).
See, for example, Beth Gardiner, Survivors Upset Over Swiss Bank Case, AP
Online, 1999 WL 22036918 (Aug 24, 1999) (indicating survivors withdrawing from the
settlement because too great a percentage of the settlement fund would go to the lawyers);
Holocaust Suit Parties Withdraw, The Record (Bergen Co,NJ) A9 (Aug 24, 1999) (same).
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on the Swiss bank cases relinquished their fees, they did seek
fees in subsequent WWII cases.269
4. Potentialto prevent other forms of accountability
or redress.
Although the class action device may place victims in a powerful negotiating position, seeking collective redress through litigation can also release home governments from responsibility in
terms of providing non-judicial redress for victims through a social welfare system or by paying government-sponsored reparations.27 ° For example, the government of the Republic of the Philippines did not create any sort of truth or claims commission for
Marcos's victims because victims would be compensated via the
class action. 2 1 As a result, the government essentially competed

with the victims in seeking the return of Marcos's ill-gotten
wealth from Swiss banks. 72 Without the potential of a class action judgment, the victims may have been able to exercise more
political clout at home to ensure that they were at least partially
compensated out of any wealth returned to the Philippines. 73
Similarly, in certain circumstances, the WWII class actions
hindered efforts to create an historical record of abuses and to
establish effective non-judicial restitution mechanisms, because
the relevant companies either feared that litigation results would

See generally Authers and Wolffe, The Victim's Fortune (cited in note 118) (describing
dissatisfaction articulated by victims).
2
Authers and Wolffe, The Victim's Fortune at 202 (cited in note 118) (describing
Swiss bank cases as "loss leaders").
.. For a discussion of some non-legal governmental responses to WWII claims, see
Derek Brown, Comment, Litigating the Holocaust: A Consistent Theory in Tort for the
Private Enforcement of Human Rights Violations, 27 Pepp L Rev 553, 576-80 (2000). This
potential tradeoff between party-controlled litigation and non-judicial avenues of redress
(such as legislation) is in some respects a feature of all class actions. See Linda S.
Mullenix, Lessons From Abroad: Complexity And Convergence, 46 Vill L Rev 1, 27-31
(2001) (discussing legislative alternatives to litigation employed in other legal systems).
Congress's decision to condition eligibility to the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund upon a waiver of legal claims against the airlines (and to cap awards available to
those plaintiffs who do decide to sue) reflects this tension between remedies available
through the judicial and political branches of government. See generally Richard Nagareda, The Preexistence PrinciplesAnd The Structure Of The Class Action, 103 Colum L
Rev 149 (2003).
" I am indebted to Paul Hoffman for this observation.
272 See Manila says its claim on Marcos money superior to victims' claim, Deutsche
Presse-Agentur (Apr 15, 1997).
273 Of course, the class action provides an avenue for redress where there is or would
inevitably be legislative inaction in response to mass harms.
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be used against them or did not want to face double liability.274 On
the other hand, the threat of litigation may have spurred efforts
by European countries to reexamine their wartime history.275
Thus, judicial action may actually encourage other branches of
government to respond to the needs of victims."6
5. Difficulties in allocatingcompensation.
In a human rights class action where the plaintiff class seeks
money damages, the wide variations in plaintiffs' experiences and
the extreme nature of the abuses suffered present a challenge to
ascertaining a reasonable and acceptable model for allocating
compensatory damages.2

77

The highly individualized and personal

nature of the claims in human rights cases suggests that successful litigants should receive a particularized process to determine
damages. Yet, such a process may be unfeasible where thousands
of members belong to a human rights class.
A class action, however, can result in the establishment of a
quasi-administrative scheme that limits the need to determine
individualized damages awards and speeds the payment of compensation to individuals. 8 In the Marcos case, a Special Master
employed inferential statistics to compute an average damage
award for various harms. 9 Victims may consider this sort of
coldly mathematical calculation of damages dehumanizing because it overlooks the individual harms suffered.286 Further, deny"4 See Authers and Wolffe, The Victim's Fortune at 156 (cited in note 118).
...See Bazyler, Holocaust Justice at 298-99 (cited in note 118).
" Martha Minow, Judge For The Situation:Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator Of TemporaryAdministrative Agencies, 97 Colum L Rev 2010, 2023-24 (1997).
.77Steinhardt, 20 Yale J Intl L at 93 (cited in note 1) ("[Tlhe law and logistics of proving damages thus undermine the propriety of the class certification."). One commentator
has suggested that difficulties in assessing compensatory damages may be addressed by
the creation of a free-floating punitive class. See Weinstein, 11 Duke J Comp & Intl L at
173 (cited in note 173).
" See In re Diet Drugs Products Liability Litigation, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 12275
(establishing administrative relief regime); Minow, 97 Colum L Rev at 2019-22 (cited in
note 276) (discussing examples of judicially-created temporary administrative agencies to
process individual claims).
" Courts are encouraged to use creative methods of determining damages where
individualized compensation may be impractical. Manual for Complex Litigation, Second
§ 30.47 (CCH 1985) (noting techniques for allocating settlement funds short of individual
determinations of damages).
'
Chibundu, 39 Va J Intl L at 1108 (cited in note 6):
[C]lass action litigation . . . hardly enhances the promotion of the humanizing norms presumably at the core of human rights. In fact, it depersonalizes the issues at stake. Mired in quarrels over statistical samplings,
focus all too easily shifts from the tragic and human stories the litigation
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ing each plaintiff the opportunity to testify about the harms experienced can limit the cathartic or rehabilitative effect of the
litigation process. At the same time, a class award may create
distributional equities that are attractive to a victim group and
avoid impressions of unfairness where "the luck of the draw,281
results in vastly different individualized determinations.2 8 The
opportunity to participate in litigation at all can also provide victims of human rights violations with a form of non-monetary rehabilitation by restoring a sense of justice, dignity and "moral
equilibrium." 8 3 To the extent that a repressive government no
longer wields power, litigants may be able to use home government social welfare agencies to collect evidence and undertake
individualized determinations of applicable claims and compensatory damages.
In addition to the challenges of computing compensatory
damages with a large class, intra-class conflicts almost inevitably
emerge when seeking relief or allocating damages between different groups of plaintiffs or sub-classes.284 This is especially true
where the damages sought involve intangible and individual assessments of pain and suffering, as opposed to the types of damages more amenable to objective proof, such as lost wages or
medical costs.2 5 Such structural conflicts have tarnished victims'
experiences with collective actions.28 6 For example, in the German
forced labor cases, once specific settlements were contemplated,
different victims groups found themselves competing with each
other for the limited funds available. 7

is supposed to recreate and the sense of personal worth litigation should
vindicate.
Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 928 (cited in note 194).
2
See, for example, Boyd, 1999 BYU L Rev at 1187 (cited in note 3) (noting that the
calculation of damages is less complex when the entity theory of class certification and
recovery is employed).
'
Id at 1189 (cited in note 3).
See Rhode, 34 Stan L Rev at 1189 (cited in note 181) (noting that factions within
the class inevitably emerge when relief specifics are contemplated).
See Schreiber & Weissbach, 31 Loyola LA L Rev at 482-83 (cited in note 33) (discussing strategy for computing lost wages in Marcos litigation)
' For a discussion of infighting between recipients of the WWII restitution settlements, see Bazyler, 25 Fordham Intl L J at 101 (cited in note 120); Vagts and Murray, 43
Harv Intl L J at 522 (cited in note 120).
"7 See Bazyler, Holocaust Justice at 269-85 (cited in note 118); Authers and Wolffe,
The Victim's Fortune at 233-34 (cited in note 118) (describing acrimonious negotiations
between groups and attorneys representing Jewish and Eastern European individuals
who had been conscripted into forced labor).
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III. THE FUTURE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CLASS ACTION

The class action mechanism has the potential to provide victims of large-scale human rights abuses with the ability to
achieve some measure of justice in cases where the alternative
may be no justice at all. The nature of many international norms
and international theories of liability lend themselves to class
treatment, because they address collective harms or acts targeted
at particular protected groups or communities. In addition, class
treatment may be appropriate for cases involving allegations of
command responsibility or violative corporate conduct. Class actions ensure that any remedy reflects the collective nature of the
harm suffered and that individuals or organizations responsible
for human rights abuses will face accountability for the full scope
of the harm that they cause. Class actions also enable victims of
human rights violations to exercise negotiating power on a governmental or corporate level that would otherwise be unattainable.
On the other hand, class actions may result in dissatisfaction
among members of the victim class if counsel or the courts do not
facilitate the participation of class members or where collusion
between various actors undercuts class claims, interests, or involvement. Proceeding as a class may also hinder other forms of
accountability through intergovernmental, governmental, or nongovernmental spheres. On balance, however, the class action suggests great potential as a tool to enforce international human
rights norms under the ATCA and the TVPA.
Given the advantages and disadvantages to employing the
class action mechanism in the human rights context, this Article
concludes by outlining an interpretive framework for the federal
class action certification and management rules. This framework
relies on the argument that, in applying Rule 23's certification
requirements, courts should recognize Congress's strong policy in
favor of these cases being heard in United States courts. Accordingly, courts should approach human rights class actions mindful
of the unique characteristics and objectives of human rights litigation, including the collective nature of international claims and
responsibility theories, the political and often oppressive contexts
in which victims of human rights abuses bring suit, the daunting
hurdles faced by such victims in obtaining justice, and these
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cases' foundation in traditional public law litigation. 288 This
framework also recognizes that federal courts are charged with
fashioning common law remedies for cases brought under these
statutes in the absence of congressional guidance. At the same
time, given the unique vulnerabilities of absentee human rights
claimants, courts must, to ensure a just and meaningful result,
continually guard against collusive moves between other participants in the litigation.
This Part thus conducts a brief review of the procedural rules
governing the certification and management of class actions, illustrating the ways in which human rights class actions may be
fit within established doctrines. 289 The interpretive methodology
offered here invites courts to adopt more liberal and more stringent approaches to Rule 23's requirements in order to reflect the
special nature of human rights class cases.29 ° These modest proposals may help human rights litigants more fully realize the advantages of the class action mechanism. These recommendations
may also assist courts in developing approaches for administering
human rights class actions, notwithstanding the unique challenges that they present.
A. The Interpretive Framework
With the passage of the ATCA and the TVPA, and with the
adoption of human rights amendments to the FSIA, Congress has
' See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,89 Harv L Rev

1281, 1284, 1302 (1976) (noting emergence of new forms of litigation involving "sprawling"
party structure, negotiation and mediation processes, a central role for the judge in organizing the case, and complex forms of relief); Koh, 100 Yale L J at 2348-49 (cited in note
2) (describing motivations of transnational public law litigants); Joan Fitzpatrick, The
Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789: Lessons from In re Marcos Human Rights

Litigation, 67 St John's L Rev 491, 503 (1993) (noting that human rights class members
might more closely resemble the "ideologically motivated plaintiffs in desegregation suits"
than victims of ordinary mass torts). But see Mullenix, 33 Val U L Rev at 415, 426 (cited
in note 264) (arguing that mass tort litigation is not within the tradition of public law
litigation heralded by Chayes, because such cases are not typically brought to seek the
reform of public or quasi-public institutions and primarily involve private parties alleging
private harms and seeking private remedies).
' This Part assumes that after Ortiz, most human rights class actions will proceed as
voluntary classes under Rule 23(b)(3). This Article does not consider legislative solutions
to some of the challenges identified because existing procedural rules can accommodate
the human rights class action.
o It has been suggested that the courts in the Marcos and Karadzic class actions
adopted a more lenient approach to the Federal Rules in light of the uniqueness of these
cases. See Perl, 88 Georgetown L J at 779-87 (cited in note 7) (describing how courts have
not subjected human rights class actions to stringent certification requirements imposed
on other mass tort cases).
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expressly empowered the federal courts to adjudicate violations of
international law. These statutes do not address the availability
of class treatment for cases arising under them. However, in the
absence of a direct expression by Congress to depart from Rule 1,
which provides that the Federal Rules govern the procedure in
"all suits of a civil nature," class relief is authorized.2 9' Further,
where Congress has declined to provide guidance as to how human rights class actions should be managed, federal courts are
invited to create "federal common law to provide justice for any
injury contemplated" by those statutes.29 2 This will ensure that
the courts effectuate the purposes of international law and those
statutes and ensure an appropriate remedy for the violations at
issue."'
By way of background, the ATCA is an ancient statute, originally enacted in 1789 as part of the First Judiciary Act. ' The
statute was rarely used until the seminal 1980 case of Filartiga,95
in which the Second Circuit confirmed that the ATCA provides
federal jurisdiction over international law violations.2 96 In 1984,
Califano v Yamasaki, 442 US 682, 700 (1979).
Alvarez-Machain v United States, 331 F3d 604, 635 (9th Cir 2003) ("[B]ecause the
ATCA invokes international law principles of universal concern, it holds a unique place
among federal statutory tort causes of action, and application of federal common law is
therefore appropriate."); Estate of Marcos, 910 F Supp at 1469 ("Because Congress in the
TVPA offered no methodology as to how damages should be determined, federal courts are
free to and should create federal common law to provide justice for any injury contemplated by the Alien Tort Statute and the TVPA or treaties dealing with the protection of
human rights."); Abebe-Jira v Negewo, 72 F3d 844, 848 (11th Cir 1996) ("[T]he Alien Tort
Claims Act establishes a federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law
remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law."); Tachiona v Mugabe,
216 F Supp 2d 262, 267 (S D NY 2002).
Filartigav Pefia-Irala,577 F Supp 860, 886 (E D NY 1984) (concluding that by
enacting the ATCA, "Congress entrusted the task [of enforcing international law] to the
federal courts and gave them powers to choose and develop federal remedies to effectuate
the purposes of international law incorporated into the United States common law. In
order to take the international condemnation of torture seriously this court must adopt a
remedy appropriate to the ends and reflective of the nature of the condemnation.");
Tachiona v Mugabe, 234 F Supp 2d 401, 417 (S D NY 2002) ("[Clourts, in order to reflect
the true magnitude of the universally recognized wrongs at issue and confer relief proportionate to the harms engendered, have felt compelled to pick and choose from among
available remedial options one that advances the purposes of the ATCA and international
law.").
See generally Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 Am J Intl L 461 (1989) (recounting history of and original
intent behind ATCA). Although the statute was part of the First Judiciary Act, it has no
legislative history to speak of. HT v Vencap, Ltd, 519 F2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir 1975) ("This
old but little used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since
the first Judiciary Act, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), no one seems to know whence it came.").
' 630 F2d 876.
Id at 878.
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however, Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic297 called the Filartiga
precedent into question. Tel Oren was brought on behalf of survivors and representatives of individuals killed during a terrorist
attack on a bus in Israel.29 In a fractured appellate opinion affirming the district court's dismissal of the case, Judge Bork argued in concurrence that Congress, in originally enacting the
ATCA, did not intend to provide a cause of action over international law violations such as those alleged in Tel Oren or, for that
matter, in Filartiga.99
Congress responded to Judge Bork's argument with the passage in 1991 of the TVPA. °° The legislative history of the statute
indicates that Congress soundly rejected Judge Bork's position in
Tel-Oren and sought to reaffirm the line of cases inaugurated by
Filartiga.0 1 The legislative history also notes that the TVPA was
mandated by the United States' signing and eventual ratification
of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu302
man and Degrading Treatment of Punishment ("Convention"),
which obliges state parties to provide victims of torture with a
right to reparations.3 This Convention was part of a larger
movement in international law recognizing a right to reparations
for human rights violations. °4 The purpose of the TVPA was thus
726 F2d 774 (DC Cir 1984).
Id at 775.
Id at 799, 820 (Bork concurring).
See generally Rachael E. Schwartz, 'And Tomorrow?" The Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 Ariz J Intl & Comp L 271 (1994) (recounting history and scope of TVPA).
30 See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, HR Rep No 102-367 pt 1, 102d Cong, 1st
Sess, 4 (1991) ("House Report"); Sen Rep, 1991 WL 258662 at *4 (cited in note 1) ("The
TVPA would establish an unambiguous basis for a cause of action that has been successfully maintained under [the ATCA], which permits Federal district courts to hear claims
by aliens for torts committed 'in violation of the law of nations.'"). See generally Ryan
Goodman and Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: InternationalHuman Rights and
Federal Common Law, 66 Fordham L Rev 463, 513-23 (1997) (noting that TVPA firmly
entrenched the Filartigaline of cases).
...GA Res 39/46, UN GAOR, 39th Sess, Annex 39, Supp No 51, at 197, UN Doc
A/39/51 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987, and for the United States, Nov 20, 1994)
available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/htmYmenu3/b/h_cat39.htm> (visited September 23,
2003).
'
See House Report at 3 (cited in note 301) ("Essentially enforcement-oriented, this
[Torture] Convention obligates state parties to adopt measures to ensure that torturers
are held legally accountable for their acts."); Torture Victim Protection Act, 138 Cong Rec
S2667, *S2668 (Mar 3, 1992) ("The Senate has ratified the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which obligates state
parties to adopt measures to ensure that torturers within their territories are held accountable for their acts. [The TVPA] accomplishes that purpose in a manner consistent
with the Constitution.") (Statement of Senator Specter).
" See Van Schaack, 42 Harv Intl L J at 165-69 (cited in note 174) (cataloging the
right to reparations under international law).
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to "ensure that torturers... are held legally accountable for their
acts... [and] that torturers and death squads will no longer have
05
a safe haven in the United States.""
Congress's policy toward the adjudication of human rights
°
claims is also apparent in recent amendments to the FSIA. ' By
delineating a handful of exceptions to the general cloak of immu3 °7
nity enjoyed by states and their instrumentalities, the FSIA
provides the sole statutory basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign state in U.S. courts..3 Because of this presumptive immunity, most suits claiming human rights violations committed
abroad could only be brought against individual defendants under the ATCA or TVPA.0 9 However, 1996 amendments to the
FSIA withdrew immunity from foreign states designated as "state
sponsors of terrorism"310 for acts of terrorism, or for providing material support for acts of terrorism, which include torture, extrajudicial killing, and hostage taking.3 '
This clear congressional policy favoring U.S. courts hearing
cases involving human rights abuses committed abroad and in
enforcing international human rights norms is relevant to interpreting procedural doctrines as they arise in human rights litigaSen Rep at *3 (cited in note 1).

28 USC § § 1330, 1602-11 (1988).

See 28 USC § 1605 (2003) (setting forth exceptions to immunity). The original exceptions allowed suits against foreign nations to proceed where there had been an express
or implied waiver of immunity, or where the claims involved, among other things, commercial activity within the United States, property expropriated in violation of international law, property located within the United States, or noncommercial torts committed
within the United States. Id.
117

Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Corp, 488 US 429, 443 (1989).

See, for example, Hirsh v State of Israel, 962 F Supp 377 (S D NY 1997) (dismissing
class action against Israel and Germany on foreign sovereign immunity grounds).
30 The defendant state must have been so designated under § 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App § 2405(j), or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22
USC § 2371, either at the time the challenged act occurred or as a result of the challenged
act. Currently, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and North Korea have been designated as "state sponsors of terrorism." 61 Fed Reg 43462 (Aug 22, 1996).
"' 28 USC § 1605(a)(7) authorizes U.S. courts to hear claims in which money damages
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of
torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material
support or resources ... if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an
official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her
office, employment, or agency.
In order to bring suit, the claimant must provide the state a reasonable opportunity
to arbitrate the claim. In addition, the claimant or the victim must be a United States

citizen. See generally David Mackusick, Comment, Human Rights vs. Sovereign Rights:
The State Sponsored Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 10

Emory Intl L Rev 741 (1996) (recounting history of foreign sovereign immunity under U.S.
law, including 1996 amendments).
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tion. For example, in Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 312 an individual ATCA action arising out of Shell Oil's alleged complicity
in the deaths of several environmental activists in Nigeria, the
Second Circuit ruled that the strong congressional policy favoring
jurisdiction is relevant to courts' application of the forum non
conveniens doctrine.3 13 In particular, the court noted that the
TVPA, "in addition to merely permitting U.S. District Courts to
entertain suits alleging violation of the law of nations, expresses
a policy favoring receptivity by our courts to such suits. 4 In so
ruling, the court noted that: "One of the difficulties that confront
victims of torture under color of a nation's law is the enormous
difficulty of bringing suits to vindicate such abuses. Most likely,
the victims cannot sue in the place where the torture occurred."3 15
These equitable concerns about access to justice and the fact
that victims may have no remedy absent class treatment are
equally relevant and should be prioritized over pure efficiency
concerns when evaluating the propriety of class treatment in the
human rights context. These concerns thus infuse the following
discussion of the way in which human rights class actions can be
situated within Rule 23's procedural matrix. In particular, where
proceeding as a class action is "markedly superior" to other methods available for a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, the various certification requirements should be construed
"broadly"-at least in the early stages of the litigation.316
B. The Certification Requirements As Applied To Human Rights
Class Actions
A member of a class may sue as a representative party if the
class satisfies the four requirements set forth in Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representa-

312

226 F3d 88 (2d Cir 2000).

311 Id at 108 (requiring district courts to consider "the
policy favoring our court's reten-

tion of such suits brought by plaintiffs who are residents of the United States, and [Ithe
policy expressed in the TVPA favoring adjudication of claims of violations of international
prohibitions on torture").
", Id at 105.
3. Id at 106. See also Matthew R. Skolnick, Comment, The Forum
Non Conveniens
Doctrine in Alien Tort Claims Act Cases: A Shell of its Former Self After Wiwa, 16 Emory
Intl L Rev 187, 190 (2002) (arguing that "the U.S. policy interest-as expressed in the
ATCA and TVPA-in providing a fair forum for the adjudication of human rights violations should tip the forum non conveniens analysis in favor of ATCA plaintiffs in all but
the most inconvenient of cases").
316 Green v Wolf Corp, 406 F2d 291, 301 (2d Cir 1968).
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tion. 7 In addition, the class action must fall under one of the
three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). In light of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Ortiz,"' most future human rights class actions will
likely proceed as Rule 23(b)(2) mandatory classes, where injunctive or declaratory relief is sought, or as Rule 23(b)(3) voluntary
classes, which require a showing that common issues predominate and that proceeding as a class action is superior to other
forms of adjudication. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory limited fund
actions remain available in the human rights context in situations in which the plaintiffs can demonstrate the existence of a
"limited fund" that preexists the class action, such as where a
defendant is bankrupt (or would be rendered bankrupt by any
award) or is an estate (as was the case in Marcos)."'
Even assuming the availability of mandatory limited fund
class actions, voluntary class actions may present the best model
for human rights class actions in which the plaintiff class seeks
money damages. Voluntary class actions enable litigants to gain
the benefits of collective action without entirely sacrificing claim
autonomy or experiencing the preclusive effects of res judicata
from a process that they did not voluntarily participate in and
may not have supported.32 ° And yet, under traditional modes of
analysis, some of the certification requirements for voluntary
classes-particularly the predominance and manageability components of the Rule-could serve as significant impediments to
class certification in human rights cases. This Part will discuss
317

According to FRCP 23(a):

[Olne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Although each element requires a separate determination, the relevant factors do often
merge. See General Telephone Co of Southwest v Falcon, 457 US 147, 157 n 13 (1982).
3" 527 US 815 (1999).
"' Recent case law and scholarship have suggested that constitutional limits on punitive damage amounts-as discussed in BMW of North America v Gore, 517 US 559 (1996),

and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co v Campbell, 123 SCt 1513 (2003)-may

lead to a finding that a limited fund exists. See, for example, In re Northern Dist of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, 521 F Supp 1188, 1193 (N D Ca

1981) (certifying mandatory punitive damages class on theory that constitutional limits on
punitive damages created a limited fund within meaning of the Rule). See generally

Elizabeth Cabreser, Undoing Underdeterrence Through Classwide Punitive Damages, 36

Wake Forest L Rev 979, 1027-33 (2001).
" See text accompanying notes 218-221 supra.
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the ways in which human rights class actions may be conceptualized vis-A-vis the various certification requirements, with an eye
toward encouraging courts to adopt a creative approach to vindicating human rights norms through the class mechanism.
1. Numerosity.
Numerosity has not historically presented an impediment to
certification of human rights classes. To date, all human rights
class actions have involved allegations of large-scale abuses impacting thousands of potential class members.32 ' Yet, to the extent
that litigants seek certification of multiple sub-classes or a class
of individuals subject to a single massacre or repressive episode,32 the numerosity requirement may present more of an impediment to certification if victims are not sufficiently numerous.

323

The numerosity requirement turns on the "impracticability,"
not impossibility, of joinder,324 and this determination depends on
the particular circumstances of each case. 325 Accordingly, the geographic diversity of the class members, 6 the class's economic
means, class members' continued confinement,3 8 the ability of
claimants to institute individual suits, 329 the requests for prospective injunctive relief,330 and the nature of the harms alleged by
human rights claimants may weigh in favor of a finding that
joinder would be impracticable. Class members' fears of reprisals

See, for example, Hilao, 103 F3d at 772 (involving a class of ten thousand individuals); Aguinda v Texaco, Inc, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 4718, -?2 (S D NY) (seeking to represent
a class of over thirty thousand indigenous persons). It is not necessary for the party seeking certification to provide evidence of the exact class size to satisfy the numerosity requirement. See Robidoux v Celani, 987 F2d 931, 935 (2d Cir 1993).
.' For example, in the case of Bowoto v Chevron, victims of two massacres involving
Chevron property and vehicles have joined in an individual action rather than a class
action. See Bowoto v Chevron Texaco Corp, Case No C99-2506 SI (N D Cal) Fourth
Amended
Complaint available at http://www.earthrights.org/chevron/4thamended
complaint.doc (visited September 23, 2003).
" See Wilkinson v FBI, 99 FRD 148, 156 n 9 (C D Cal 1983) (denying certification to
small subclass).
32 Robidoux, 987 F2d
at 935.
32 Id at 936.
32 See In re Laser Arms Corp Securities Litigation, 794 F Supp 475, 494 (S D NY
1989).
327 See HaitianRefugee Center, Inc v Nelson, 694
F Supp 864, 877 (S D Fla 1988).
' See Armstead v Pingree,629 F Supp 273, 276 (M D Fla 1986).
'2' Robidoux, 987 F2d at 936.
3o Id.
321
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present an additional factor in considering the practicability of
joinder.331
2. Commonality.
The commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) requires the existence of questions of law or fact common to the class. It is not
necessary for all questions of law or fact to be common or for all
class members to assert identical claims.332 Class members may
assert a common complaint, even if they have not all suffered the
same actual injuries, as long as they were subjected to the same
harm.333 A common question is one that arises from a "nucleus of
operative facts," regardless of whether the "underlying facts fluc4
tuate over the class period and vary as to individual claimants.
Thus, human rights claimants contesting a repressive policy or
course of conduct need not have each experienced the same physi335
cal or mental harm in order to constitute a viable class.
As a threshold matter, in all ATCA cases, claims for relief
336
must constitute torts in violation of the law of nations. Further,
many international law norms contain elements, such as attendant circumstances, state action, or mens rea elements, the proof
of which would be common to all members of the class. For example, to prove the commission of war crimes, violations of interna-

" See, for example, Mullen v Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F3d 620, 625 (5th Cir
1999) (noting a fear of retaliation by employer); Trautz v Weisman, 846 F Supp 1160, 1166
(S D NY 1994) (noting fear of retaliation by workers at adult care facility).
" As an additional requirement, in cases seeking to certify voluntary classes under
Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs must also show that these common issues predominate over uncommon issues. See FRCP 23(b)(3). In contrast, in FRCP 23(b)(2) classes, factual differences among plaintiffs are less relevant as "[cilass actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.. . by their very nature present common questions of law or fact." Haitian
Refugee Center, 694 F Supp at 877.
' See Hassine v Jeffes, 846 F2d 169, 176-77 (3d Cir 1988) (noting plaintiffs' assertions that they were subject to certain conditions of confinement, even if they had not at
the time been injured by those conditions, were sufficient to allow class certification); Baby
Neal, 43 F3d at 56, 61 (finding that the differing degree and nature of the plaintiffs' injuries did not preclude a finding of commonality where plaintiffs challenged defendant's
conduct toward the class).
Cohen v Uniroyal, Inc, 77 FRD 685, 690, 691 (E D Pa 1977).
Sterling v Velsicol Chemical Corp, 855 F2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir 1988) ("PW]here the
defendant's liability can be determined on a class-wide basis because the cause of the
disaster is a single course of conduct which is identical for each of the plaintiffs, a class
action may be the best suited vehicle to resolve such a controversy.").
See Unocal, 963 F Supp at 890 (noting that ATCA requires allegations of the commission of a tort in violation of international law). See also Boyd, 1999 BYU L Rev at 1160
(cited in note 3) (noting that common questions of law include whether there is an applicable and recognized rule of international law that has been violated).
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tional humanitarian law must have occurred in a time of armed
conflict. 37 Crimes against humanity occur within the context of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population
where the defendant had knowledge of the attack. 338 Likewise,

torture is prohibited by international law only when committed
by state actors,339 unless it is committed as a war crime, crime
against humanity, or genocide.34° For example, in Karadzic, the
common questions of law and fact asserted by the plaintiffs focused on whether Karadzic acted with the intent to destroy in
whole or in part a protected group (an element of genocide);
whether the acts alleged were committed within the course of an
armed conflict (an element of war crimes); whether the Srpska
regime constituted a state for the purpose of state action requirements; and whether Karadzic acted under the color of law.34'
In order to oppose many defenses (such as those advanced under
the political question or act of state doctrines), plaintiffs must put
forth common proof that supports a finding of commonality.
These defenses can be judged once, with respect to all members of
the class. Because the substantive law applied in these cases is
primarily federal and international law, and because members of
the class may be overseas, it is unlikely that human rights class
actions will present the kinds of conflicts of law questions that
plague other mass tort class actions and threaten commonality
(not to mention predominance).34'
...According to Article 2 of each of the four Geneva Conventions, the Conventions
apply to all cases of declared war "or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by
one of them." See, for example, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949 6 UST 3114, 3116, Art 2,
TIAS no 3362 (1942).
See notes 184, 186.
See Art 1, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment of Punishment GA Res 39/46, UN GAOR, 39th Sess, Annex 39, Supp No 51, at
197, UN Doc A/39/51 (1984) (cited in note 302) (prohibiting torture when committed "by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity").
.. See Unocal, 2002 US App LEXIS at *31:
[Elven crimes like rape, torture, and summary execution, which by themselves require state action for ATCA liability to attach, do not require
state action when committed in furtherance of other crimes like slave
trading, genocide or war crimes, which by themselves do not require state
action for ATCA liability to attach.
"4 Doe v Karadzic, 176 FRD 458, 461-62 (S D NY 1997) (identifying common questions).
"2 See, for example, In re LaserArms Corp SecuritiesLitigation, 794 F Supp 475, 495
(finding plaintiffs' pendent state law claims not amenable to class treatment where the
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Human rights class actions alleging the liability of a corporate entity should easily satisfy the commonality requirement
where a conspiracy, common course of conduct, or general policy
is at issue.34 For example, common questions of law and fact in
this context regularly include: whether the operation of the corporation's offshore enterprise violated international law or was
otherwise unlawful; whether the corporation was responsible for
abusive practices either directly, as an aider and abettor or coconspirator, or by virtue of its membership in a joint venture with
a repressive government; whether the corporate entity knowingly
or intentionally used slave or other forced labor in its operations;
whether the corporate entity provided material or financial assistance to state actors who were responsible for the abuses;
whether the corporate entity knew that revenues paid to the host
government were supporting the commission of abuses; whether
plaintiffs suffered the harms alleged as a result of actions taken
in furtherance of the joint venture or project at issue; whether the
corporate defendant can be considered a state actor by virtue of
the structure and operation of its joint venture; whether the corporation has been unjustly enriched by abusive practices; and
whether a parent corporation may be liable for acts of a subsidiary operating in a particular country.344 Similarly, where the case
arises from actions of a joint venturer, the corporation's knowlcourt would have to apply the law of each state in which a potential class member resided). Further, human rights claims do not present issues of contributory negligence,
causal indeterminacy, or latency that characterize other mass tort cases. See, for example,
In re American Medical Systems, Inc, 75 F3d 1069 (6th Cir 1996) (decertifying class where

individual issues of causation and harm predominated); Boyd, 1999 BYU L Rev at 1162
(cited in note 3) (noting that variations in the degree of harm in human rights cases do not
matter for purposes of typicality when the proximate cause of the harm is the same).
" By way of analogy, securities fraud and RICO actions often proceed under this
single course of conduct theory of commonality. See, for example, LaserArms, 794 F Supp
at 494-95 (alleging defendants engaged in a common course of fraudulent conduct to illegally distribute shares); Kirkpatrick v J C Bradford & Co, 827 F2d 718, 722 (11th Cir
1987); Kennedy v Tallant, 710 F2d 711, 717 (11th Cir 1983) (noting that plaintiffs claimed
that defendants "committed the same [violations of the securities laws] in the same
method against an entire class"); Buford v H & R Block Inc, 168 FRD 340, 349-50 (S D Ga
1996) (finding commonality where plaintiffs sued under RICO, alleging a uniform and
concerted effort to defraud the class).
...See, for example, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, Amended

Class Action Complaint at 25-26 (S D NY Feb 25, 2002) (on file with U Chi Legal F); Bodner v Banque Paribas,114 F Supp 2d 117, 125-26 (E D NY 2000) (finding plaintiff class's
conspiracy allegations to be sufficient); Sarei v Rio Tinto, plc, Class Action Complaint For
Violations of the Alien Tort Claims Act 19-20 (C D Cal Nov 2, 2000) (on file with U Chi
Legal F ) Pollack v Siemens AG, First Amended Class Action Complaint (E D NY Sept 1,
1998) (on file with U Chi Legal F ),Doe v Unocal, Complaint for Damages and Injunctive
and Declaratory Relief (C D Cal Oct 3, 1996) at 9-10 (on file with U Chi Legal F).
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edge or support of these abuses also presents a question of fact
that will be common to the class.345
Likewise, in cases invoking the doctrine of command responsibility, and brought against military or civilian superiors, the
key issues are command, knowledge, and omission, which are
analyzed with respect to the entire class. 346 Although each plaintiff must prove that a subordinate of the defendant commander
injured her, the other aspects of the doctrine, for example,
whether the defendant was on notice of abuses by subordinates
and whether he fulfilled his duty of command by preventing or
punishing such abuses, are common to all members of the class.347
Thus, common questions of law and fact in command responsibility cases include: the structure, organization and chain of command within a state security or military apparatus and the defendant's position and power within that structure; whether subordinates of the defendant engaged in abuses; whether the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the violations; whether
the defendant failed in his duty to supervise and control his subordinates; and whether the defendant qualifies as a state actor if
the relevant international norms require state action.
In these corporate and command responsibility cases, liability becomes an "all-or-nothing" proposition. Because of the broad
questions of liability applicable to all members of the plaintiff
class, a defendant's liability is not determined on a plaintiff-byplaintiff basis,3 9 and defendants are likely to contest liability regarding the entire class, rather than regarding individual members of the class. 5 °
145Simpson

v Specialty Retail Concepts, 149 FRD 94, 99 (M D NC 1993) (finding scienter to be common question).
" See Blackie v Barrack, 524 F2d 891, 905-906 (9th Cir 1975) (noting that common
issues predominate in securities actions where defendant's omissions are at issue).
;"' Causation is inherent to a finding of the three elements of the doctrine, so it need
not be proved by each individual plaintiff. Hilao, 103 F3d at 774 (finding that the issue of
causation was resolved by the finding of liability); Ford v Garcia, 289 F3d 1283, 1298-99
(11th Cir 2002) (Barkett concurring) (finding inclusion of proximate cause instruction in
jury instructions erroneous).
'4' Doe v Karadzic, Amended Complaint for Genocide; War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity; Summary Execution; Forced Disappearance; Torture; Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment; Wrongful Death; Assault and Battery; and International Infliction of
Emotional Harm 10 (S D NY June 30, 1997) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
"' See In re AH Robins Co, Inc, 85 BR 373, 379 (E D Va 1988) (finding insurance carrier's liability to be an "all-or-nothing proposition" unable to be resolved on a plaintiff-byplaintiff basis).
" See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 100 FRD 718, 723 (E D NY
1983).
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That said, to the extent that significant variations exist in
the nature of the harm suffered (for example, if some members of
a class were subjected to torture, and others to summary execution, property damage, or environmental harm),351 courts can utilize a number of case management techniques to address the disparities within the context of class treatment. These include creating sub-classes and appointing additional class representatives
under Rule 23(c)(4)(B)," allowing limited opt-out rights 3 bifurcating the liability and damages phases of a trial and requiring
the filing of individual damage claims after a finding of liability," '
recruiting Special Masters to conduct mini-hearings on damages,
and certifying class treatment for selected common issues, such
as liability or punitive damages, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4)(A). 355
Courts have successfully used these techniques in several
human rights class actions. For example, the WWII cases dealt
with varying allegations by certifying subclasses.5 6 The statistical
sampling employed in the Marcos case allowed the jury to evalu31 Demands for punitive damages in cases involving multiple acts of misconduct may
also threaten the commonality and predominance requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) unless the
plaintiffs can frame the defendants' behavior in terms of a consistent course of conduct.
See Laura J. Hines, Obstacles To Determining Punitive Damages In Class Actions, 36
Wake Forest L Rev 889, 915-16 (2001) (discussing threat of duplicative and uneven punitive damage awards in situations in which plaintiffs can opt out of class). One proposed
solution is the certification of a mandatory class solely for the purpose of determining and
allocating punitive damages. See Richard Nagareda, Punitive Damages Class Actions and
the Baseline of Tort, 36 Wake Forest L Rev 943 (2001).
" This Rule states that "a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass
treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied
accordingly." FRCP 23(c)(4)(B). Accordingly, each subclass "must independently meet the
requirements of Rule 23," including the identification of a proper class representative.
Betts v Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd, 659 F2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir 1981). See also Hartman v Duffey, 19 F3d 1459, 1471 (DC Cir 1994) (noting that it may be preferable, though
not necessary, to identify sub-classes where plaintiffs suffered discrimination in different
job categories). Sub-classing might require separate counsel to satisfy the representation
requirement, especially if damages are to be assessed on the basis of the nature of the
harm suffered. See Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via
Rule 23, 80 Cornell L Rev 858, 896 (1995).
County of Suffolk v Long Island Lighting Co, 907 F2d 1295, 1302-04 (9th Cir 1990).
See, for example, In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F Supp 278, 281-82 (S D
NY 1971) (proposing submission of individualized claims); Simon v Phillip Morris Inc, 200
FRD 21, 50 (E D NY 2001) (discussing bifurcation of compensatory liability and punitive
damages phases).
This Rule provides that a class action may be "brought or maintained . . . with
respect to particular issues." See, for example, Jenkins v Raymark Industries,Inc, 782 F2d
468, 471-72 (5th Cir 1986) (affirming certification of class action for common issuesincluding "state of the art" defense, product defectiveness, and punitive damages-and
mini-trials for non-common issues).
' See, for example, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F Supp 2d 139, 14344 (E D NY 2000) (certifying five subclasses).
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ate the damages of a random sample of plaintiffs in three subclasses: plaintiffs who were tortured, the families of individuals
who were summarily executed, and the families of individuals
who were disappeared. 57 In Sarei v Rio Tinto PLC,358 a putative
class action seeking to hold Rio Tinto mining company responsible for destroying the environment and fomenting a civil war in
Papua New Guinea, 59 plaintiffs had contemplated three subclasses: (1) those individuals injured or killed as a result of the
conflict in Papua New Guinea (the so-called "War Crimes Class"),
(2) those individuals seeking relief because of environmental, social, or cultural harm (the so-called "Environmental Right to Life
Class"), and (3) those individuals residing near the mine in question who were exposed to toxic effluents and other hazardous
agents (the so-called "Medical Monitoring Class").36 Still, courts
must guard against the "Balkanization" of the class through the
proliferation of sub-classes and class counsel so that the class
does not fragment "into a loose-knit coalition of potentially feud'
ing enclaves." 61
3. Typicality.
To satisfy the test for typicality, the class representative's
claims must "arise D from the same event or course of conduct
that gives rise to claims of other class members and the claims
[must be] based on the same legal theory." 2 Typicality, therefore,
exists when a single defense, such as a lack of command, or the
applicability of the political question doctrine, applies to all class
members and makes a defendant's liability indivisible. 36 3 Typicality does not require total identity of issues between the class representative and the members of the class. Factual differences
"will not render a [representative's] claim atypical if the claim
arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that
gives rise to the claims of the class members, and if it is based on

"5 See Estate of Marcos, 910 F Supp at 1462.
3" 221 F Supp 2d 1116 (C D Cal 2002).
39 Id.

. Sarei v Rio Tinto PLC, Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Alien Tort
Claims Act 18 (C D Cal Nov 2, 2000) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
" Coffee, 100 Colum L Rev at 375-76 (cited in note 194).
...Dura-Bilt Corp v Chase ManhattanCorp, 89 FRD 87, 99 (S D NY 1981).
31 See In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 818 F2d 145, 166-67 (2d Cir
1987) (noting commonality and typicality of government contractor defense vis-A-vis all
plaintiffs).
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the same legal theory."364 Even "relatively pronounced factual differences will generally not preclude a finding of typicality where
there is a strong similarity of legal theories, " "' as in class actions
alleging command responsibility or corporate complicity.
As was seen with respect to the commonality requirement,
the nature of human rights class claims lend themselves to typicality findings: "Where an action challenges a policy or practice,
the named plaintiffs suffering one specific injury from the practice can represent a class suffering other injuries, so long as all
the injuries are shown to result from the practice."36' 6 In the corporate liability context, a claim of unjust enrichment can satisfy the
typicality requirement. By focusing on how defendants have been
enriched by the alleged harm, this approach diminishes the salience of different conditions under which individuals may have
been harmed by a corporate entity and reinforces the commonality of plaintiffs' accusations and the typicality of the named representative's experience."' As in domestic discrimination
class
actions brought under U.S. civil rights statutes,36 human rights

' Newberg and Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 3.15 at 3-78 (cited in note 215).
See, for example, Lawson v Wainwright, 108 FRD 450, 456 (S D Fla 1986), revd on other
grounds as, Lawson v Singletary, 85 F3d 502 (lth Cir 1996) (finding factual differences
relating to inmates' conditions, duration, type, or location of confinement did not defeat
typicality of representative's claims where there was a sufficient nexus between those
claims and the common questions of law and fact).
Baby Neal, 43 F3d at 58.
Id.
See David N. Fagan, Note, Achieving Restitution: The PotentialUnjust Enrichment
Claims of Indigenous Peoples Against Multinational Corporations, 76 NYU L Rev 626
(2001) (analyzing core elements of potential unjust enrichment claims against corporations). This was the approach taken by plaintiffs in many of the post-WWII cases. See
Vagts and Murray, 43 Harv Intl L J at 520-21 (cited in note 120) ("All plaintiffs shared a
common interest in identifying and assessing the pool of unjust enrichment redounding to
a defendant from the use of forced and slave labor. Practically any claimant could serve as
a representative for the others.").
'
In General Telephone Co of Southwest v Falcon, 457 US 147, 157-58 (1982), the
Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's "across the board" approach to discrimination
class actions by holding that commonality and typicality are not satisfied where the class
representative alleged conclusively that the class suffered discrimination on the basis of
their membership in a particular group. Rather, the Court ruled that plaintiffs must show
the application of similar discriminatory employment practices among class representatives and the putative class. See also Shipes v Trinity Industries, 987 F2d 311, 316 (5th
Cir 1993) ("Allegations of similar discriminatory employment practices .. . satisfy the
commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)."). Thus, a plaintiff asserting one
type of discrimination can represent a class of individuals asserting other types of discrimination, so long as there are allegations that his harm manifested itself in the same
general fashion as the discriminatory acts directed to other members of the class or was
orchestrated by the same group of individuals within an organization. See Rossini v
Ogilvy & Mather, Inc, 798 F2d 590, 597-98 (2d Cir 1986).
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claimants cannot satisfy the typicality requirement with conclusory allegations that the class representative and the plaintiff
class were targeted by virtue of their ethnic, racial, religious, or
national identity. Rather, "plaintiffs must make a significant
showing to permit the court to infer that members of the class
suffered from a common policy of discrimination that pervaded"
the defendant's conduct. 3" This includes evidence of a centralized
policy toward or decisionmaking about the contested policy.
For example, the Ninth Circuit, in approving the certification
of the plaintiff class in Marcos, conceptualized the typicality requirement in terms of the pain and suffering experienced by the
plaintiffs and their family members as a result of the torture,
summary execution, or disappearance at the hands of Marcos's
subordinates.37 ° In particular, the court noted that the question of
whether any compensable injury exist[ed] for a particular
class member [was] virtually identical in each case. Did
the victim experience pain and suffering from the torture,
summary execution, or "disappearance"? In the case of
those who were executed or "disappeared", did their
survi3711
earnings?
victim's
the
of
loss
the
from
suffer
vors
To the extent that courts focus on the different torts alleged, or
the different conditions under which individuals were injured, the
appointment
of multiple class representatives can ensure typical3 72
ity.
4. Adequacy of representation.
The adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4)
ensures that the representative parties protect the absentee class
members' interests. A court must ensure that: (1) there are no
conflicts of interest among the class representatives and other
members of the class that would prevent the class representative
from vigorously advocating the class claims, and (2) class counsel
is adequate to represent the class.373 The key consideration is "the
forth-rightness and vigor with which the representative party can
370

Hartman v Duffey, 19 F3d 1459, 1472 (D C Cir 1994).
Hilao, 103 F3d at 774.

371

Id.

3

Hoxworth v Blinder,Robinson and Co, Inc, 980 F2d 912, 923 (3rd Cir 1992) (finding

typicality satisfied where plaintiff added additional class representatives to represent
each claim).
" See Dura-Bilt Corp v Chase ManhattanCorp, 89 FRD 87, 100-01 (S D NY 1981).

HeinOnline -- 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 344 2003

279]

CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION

345

be expected to assert and defend the interests of the members of
the class."374 The court has a continuing duty to ensure that the
representation requirement is met during all stages of the litigation.375
In human rights cases, it is perhaps less likely that members
of the class and class representatives would possess antagonistic
interests in terms of legal claims or desired relief."6 However,
concerns about class representatives accurately and fairly representing the interests of the absentee members of the class remain
acute, which suggests that courts should take an active role in
monitoring the choice of class representatives in human rights
cases. Courts and counsel can ensure that the class representatives are capable of undertaking their fiduciary obligations by
identifying natural leaders in the impacted community, such as
individuals who have already spoken out about abuses in a representative capacity, individuals who have formed or lead victims'
organizations, or individuals who have otherwise earned the respect of other members of the potential class. Courts and class
counsel must also ensure that individual claimants can sufficiently and meaningfully oversee the conduct of litigation and be
actively involved in the prosecution of their claims.3 77 Courts can

also establish procedures to facilitate the participation of class
members, other members of impacted communities, and interested outsiders such as human rights advocates in establishing
notice regimes and in evaluating proposed settlements or the allocation of attorney's fees. 3" This may require courts to ensure

the existence of a continual outreach process that enables class
counsel and representatives to discern and accurately reflect the
positions of their constituencies. This active involvement in victims' communities will also ensure a process through which the
3" Mersay v FirstRepublic Corp ofAmerica, 43 FRD 465, 470 (S D NY 1968).
See Key v Gillette Co, 782 F2d 5, 7 (1st Cir 1986) (affirming revocation of certification where representative would not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class).
376 See Amchem, 521 US at 626 (finding interests of already-injured versus exposureonly claimants to be unaligned).
...See Mullenix, 33 Val U L Rev at 436-37 (cited in note 264) (citing examples of
uninformed class representatives); Massengill v Board of Education,Antioch Community
High School, 88 FRD 181, 185 (N D Ill 1980) (stating that personal characteristics of the
class representative may be relevant in assessing adequacy). But see Kirkpatrick 827 F2d
at 727 (noting that the economics of class actions are such that the vigor to pursue the
case may be provided by class counsel rather than class representatives).
37 See Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting The Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class
Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 Duke J Comp & Int'l L 179, 206 (1991) (listing
judicial protective measures).
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potentially "unstable, inchoate, or conflicting preferences"3 79 of
members of the class can be aired and debated, so that some consensus can be reached.38 ° Thus, these strategies will enable class
members to have a "voice" in the conduct of the litigation, if they
so desire." '
In determining whether class counsel's representation is
"adequate," courts should consider more than whether class counsel has experience managing class actions. Courts should also
consider to what degree a particular practitioner has experience
working with human rights victims, or will be partnering with
human rights advocates in litigating the case.38 This ensures that
the special needs and vulnerabilities of victims of human rights
abuses are accounted for. Furthermore, courts should ensure that
class counsel are knowledgeable about the unique circumstances
of the region where the abuses occurred. Taken together, these
procedures will help class members monitor class representatives
and counsel in order to minimize the agency costs inherent to
class representation.3 3
5. Predominance.
Voluntary classes require not only commonality, but also that
the common questions of law and fact predominate in the litigation.384 This requirement demands more than the commonality
requirement. It ensures that the proposed class is sufficiently
cohesive to warrant representative treatment. 38 The predominance requirement also asks whether proceeding as a class action

...Rhode, 34 Stan L Rev at 1183 (cited in note 181).
See Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 940 (cited in note 194) (noting importance of
establishing widest representation possible consistent with efficient case management
concerns and undertaking periodic sampling of members of class).
" See generally Coffee, 100 Colum L Rev 370 (cited in note 194) (discussing need and
strategies for increasing class members' voice and exit rights and the loyalty of agents in
class action litigation).
"2 This could include any of the human rights legal clinics, such as the Lowenstein
Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School, or human rights non-profits that specialize in
ATCAITVPA litigation, such as the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York or the
Center for Justice & Accountability in San Francisco.
383 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305 (1976) (discussing
agency costs generally).
FRCP 23(b)(3).
See Amchem, 521 US at 624 (discussing questions underlying class cohesion).
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serves judicial economy and prevents a multiplicity of suits, thus
obviating the need for excessive judicial supervision.386
Because human rights class actions often challenge a course
of conduct occurring over a period of time, they are in many respects more analogous to mass tort class actions than to other
class action forms, such as the mass accident class action, which
address a single incident.3 87 As a result, the claims of individual
plaintiffs may be more dispersed, which will impact the court's
treatment of the predominance requirement in the human rights
context.3 88 In particular, predominance may be undermined where
members of a class have suffered different harms. Variations in
the allegations of class members may also give rise to disparities
in compensatory damage claims.389
However, the many questions of law and fact common in
command responsibility and corporate liability cases can support
a finding of predominance. In particular, where plaintiffs' claims
rely on allegations of a common scheme or conspiracy, the mere
presence of certain individual factors should not render the
claims unsuitable for class treatment.3 9 ° Furthermore, these cases
often involve norms requiring proof of multiple common elements
or subject to all-or-nothing defenses, such as the application of
the political question or act of state doctrines, which ensure that
common questions predominate. Thus, the only issues that
remain for individual claimants are whether they were injured by
the conduct or policy in question or, in the case of command
responsibility cases, by subordinates of the defendants. Because
the amount of damages due to each plaintiff is often an individualized issue in any class action, this alone will not defeat
predominance,"' especially where the court employs a quasiSee, for example, Zinser v Accufix Research Institute, Inc, 253 F3d 1180, 1189 (9th
Cir 2001) (finding no predominance where the law of many states would have to be applied).
" See, for example, In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 FRD 588, 591 (E D La 1991) (noting
that where "the defendant's conduct occurs in a single incident, such as the explosion at
Shell's refinery, the defendants' conduct towards each plaintiff is identical").
Amchem, 521 US at 625 (noting that mass accident cases may more easily satisfy
the predominance requirement). See, for example, Doe v Karadzic, 176 FRD 458, 463 (S D
NY 1997) (noting that predominance requirement has the potential to impede certification).
9 See Allison, 151 F3d at 419.
.. See Kirkpatrick, 827 F2d at 724-25 (noting that issues of reliance would not defeat
predominance where plaintiffs alleged the use of a common fraudulent scheme); Amchem,
521 US at 625 (noting that mass tort cases arising from a "common cause" or disaster may
satisfy the predominance requirement).
" See Trautz v Weisman, 846 F Supp 1160, 1167 (S D NY 1994):
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administrative regime to determine and allocate damages as in
Marcos."2
6. Superiority.
Finally, courts considering certification of a voluntary class
must ensure that the class action method is superior to other
forms of adjudication. The superiority requirement directs courts
to consider the four factors set forth in Rule 23(b)(3): (A) the interests of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense or separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability of concentrating the litigation in a
particular forum; and (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of the action.393 As in other mass tort contexts, class certification may be inappropriate where "the claims
vitally affect a significant aspect of the lives of the claimants ...
[and] there is a wide range of choice of the strategy."94
Given the unique characteristics and contexts of command
responsibility or corporate liability class actions, the four superiority factors may favor certification. Most class members in human rights classes will be unable to bring individual actions.395
Thus, the difficulties of obtaining justice in the human rights context favor a finding of the superiority of class treatment.396 As a
[Defendants] contend that the court will be forced to make an individual determination of damages based upon such factors as the length of stay, whether the harm inflicted upon an individual gave rise to a constitutional tort, and the degree of mental
anguish suffered. while the damage calculation may prove to be difficult, we do not
think it sufficient reason to deny plaintiffs' motion for class certification since we retain the power to modify the class, by dividing it into subclasses or certifying it only
as to certain issues or claims.
See also Green v Wolf Corp, 406 F2d 291, 300-01 (2d Cir 1968) (noting that if individualized determinations that are inherent to every action were allowed to defeat predominance, no class action could be maintained).
...See note 33.
...See FRCP 23(b)(3).
...Hobbs v NortheastAirlines, Inc, 50 FRD 76, 79 (E D Pa 1970).
3" See note 259.
' See Valentino v Carter-Wallace,Inc, 97 F3d 1227, 1234-35 (9th Cir 1996) (ruling

that a class action is superior if no other alternative exists); Phillips Petroleum Co v
Shutts, 472 US 797, 808, 809 (1985) (observing that class action is an "invention of equity," properly used when "plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action
were not available"); Korn v FranchardCorp, 456 F2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir 1972) (finding
class action treatment superior where there were no other suits pending); In re Prudential
Securities Inc Ltd PartnershipsLitigation, 163 FRD 200, 208-09 (S D NY 1995) (consider-

ing access to justice factors in connection with superiority requirement).
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result, considerations of individual control and alternative forums
may be less important in these cases. Furthermore, because human rights claims rarely arise in domestic courts and involve
conduct that occurred in different political and cultural milieu,
there are benefits to concentrating litigation in a single jurisdiction in terms of educating the court and consolidating the presentation of proof.
To be sure, large class actions involving overseas plaintiffs
may present daunting manageability concerns. The Federal Rules
impose no geographic limitations on the size or scope of classes.397
Accordingly, courts have certified large "international" classes39
requiring elaborate transnational notice schemes.399 Further,
courts have broad equitable powers to devise novel remedial approaches to ensure the manageability of complex class actions.4 °°
This is especially true in the human rights context, where the
relevant federal statutes invite courts to devise procedural innovations as a function of federal common law. 40 1 Although U.S.

courts may be relatively unfamiliar with the subject matter of
human rights suits, such suits do not necessarily present manageability concerns that surpass those of other large-scale class
actions. For example, in Marcos, the district court, with approval
from the Ninth Circuit, devised creative and complex trial management and notice schemes that enabled the case to proceed as a
class action without offending Rule 23's manageability requirement.
Still, the notice requirement can impact determinations of
whether the class action provides the superior method of adjudi" See Califano, 442 US at 702 ("Nothing in Rule 23 ... limits the geographical scope
of a class action that is brought in conformity with that Rule.").
3
See, for example, Agent Orange, 506 F Supp at 785-89 (certifying a class of U.S.

and Australian service persons exposed to Agent Orange); In re A H Robins Co, Inc, 85 BR
373, 376-78 (E D Va 1988) (finding joinder impracticable where allegedly defective product had been distributed overseas); Montelongo v Meese, 803 F2d 1341, 1352 (5th Cir 1986)
(affirming certification of international class of migrant farm workers).
See, for example, Vancouver Women's Health Collective Society v A H Robins Co,
Inc, 820 F2d 1359, 1361-63 (4th Cir 1987) (approving worldwide notice program to over
ninety countries and involving mass media public service announcements, outreach to
medical establishments and government agencies, and press releases); Montelongo, 803
F2d at 1351-52 (upholding notice effectuated through bilingual letters, media campaigns,
and personal contacts); Agent Orange, 818 F2d at 155 (acknowledging district court's
proposed notice through domestic and international media).
See, for example, Estate of Marcos, 910 F Supp at 1469 (inviting courts to create
federal common law, such as damages methodologies, to provide justice for victims of
human rights abuses in the face of congressional silence).
'' See note 292. (citing Hilao and Abebe-Jira)

HeinOnline -- 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 349 2003

350

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2003:

cation.4"2 Specifically, with ongoing abuses, members of a class
may be incarcerated, in hiding, or seeking refuge. In conflict or
immediate post-conflict situations, members of a class may be
scattered throughout refugee or transit camps and may not have
access to media or other notice publication modes. That said, certification should not be denied purely on the basis of manageability concerns where the defendant created the difficulties identified.4 °3
In the Karadzic case, for example, the court certified the
class as a mandatory class, noting that the plaintiffs might not
satisfy the predominance and manageability requirements of a
voluntary class action.4 4 The case was filed at a time when most
members of the class were still in Bosnia or Croatia. By the time
the district court dismissed the case and then reinstated it on
appeal, class members had scattered all over the globe, leaving
the protective web of refugee resettlement agencies. At the time
of certification, class counsel indicated their intention to submit a
manageable notice scheme involving individual notice through
the International Committee of the Red Cross and substitute notice through publication, websites, and other non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). °5 The scheme was not ultimately implemented, as the class was certified as a limited fund class and
then decertified in light of Ortiz ,40' but such a scheme would have
undoubtedly been difficult to implement in any meaningful way,
4" Rule 23(c)(2) requires the court in the case of voluntary classes to "direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." The notice
requirement allows litigants to enter appearances through counsel, monitor the conduct of
class counsel, and object to any contemplated settlement pursuant to Rule 23(e). For these
reasons, calls to abolish or limit notice in human rights class actions are misguided. See
Boyd, 1999 BYU L Rev at 1205-06 (cited in note 3) ("Arguments for viewing the class as a
litigant may call for more selective notice so long as an adequately representative group is
notified."). In the human rights context, the provision of adequate notice may actually be
of heightened importance given the intensely personal nature of human rights claims, the
imperative of respecting individual autonomy, and the emerging potential for collusive
proceedings.
" Six Mexican Workers v Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F2d 1301, 1306-07 (9th Cir
1990) (noting that the potential for numerous unlocated class members stemmed from
defendant's failure to keep adequate records as required by law and holding that defendant may not attempt to avoid a class suit because its own actions have made class treatment more difficult); Appleton Electric Co v Advance-United Expressways, 494 F2d 126,
135 (7th Cir 1974) ("The difficulties defendants complain of are of their own making.").
4' Doe v Karadzic, 176 FRD 458, 463 (S D NY 1997).
4" Doe v Karadzic, Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Class
Certification 15 n 6 (SD NY July 3, 1997) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
" See Doe v Karadzic, 192 FRD 133, 135 (S D NY 2000).
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especially for pro bono counsel, who may not have the resources
necessary to implement an international notice scheme.
As with the Karadzic notice plan, notice can be effectuated to
members of human rights classes through social welfare organizations and agencies, legal aid and relief organizations, victims'
organizations and NGOs, and refugee resettlement agencies. °7
For example, in Marcos, the district court ordered notice through
several NGOs in which the victims of martial law in the Philippines were members, including the Society of Ex-Detainees for
Liberation Against Detention and for Amnesty, the Task Force
Detainees of the Philippines, and Families of the Involuntary
Disappearances.4! In human rights class actions with large or
potentially difficult to define classes, courts can consider requiring members to opt into the class," 9 as the Marcos court did. ° In
Marcos, the notice plan required potential class members to return the notice form in order to join the class. Over ten thousand
persons returned the form and over 9,500 participated in the
eventual award.4" Such an opt-in scheme requires a significant
investment by class counsel to ensure against the exclusion of the
most vulnerable class members, and thus may not be appropriate
until situations have stabilized such that communication with all
potential class members is made possible. Future litigants can
also imitate the strategies employed in the WWII cases, which
utilized elaborate notice schemes involving direct mail; outreach
to victims' organizations, national NGOs, and government entities; paid advertisements in national periodicals; and internet
412
sites .

" See, for example, In reA H Robins Co, Inc, 85 BR at 376-78 (E D Va 1988) (certifying plaintiff class and instituting worldwide notice plan).
41 See Estate of Marcos, Order at 1 (May 16, 1991)
(setting forth notice plan) (on file
with U Chi Legal F). Although these organizations originally assisted in the conduct of the
litigation, some later repudiated the settlement reached in that case. See Republic of the
Philippinesv Marcos, Rejoinder to the Amicus Brief by Attorneys Domingo and Fruto and
the "petition" of Rep Rosales, et al, Civ Case Nos 0141 and SB 0185 (Sandiganbayan 1st
Div June 21, 1999) (submission by SELDA opposing settlement) (on file with U Chi Legal
F).
" Edward H. Cooper, Class Action Advice In The Form Of Questions,
11 Duke J Comp

& Int'l L 215, 230 (2001) (discussing merits of opt in regime).
4"'

Estate of Marcos, Order (May 16, 1991) (setting forth notice plan) (on file with U

Chi Legal F).
"' Estate of Marcos, 910 F Supp at 1462 n 1.
412 See, for example, In re Austrian and German
Bank Holocaust Litigation, 80 F Supp

2d 164, 169, 175 (S D NY 2000) (describing notice scheme).

HeinOnline -- 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 351 2003

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2003:

CONCLUSION

In order for international human rights norms to be meaningful, the international community must rigorously enforce them
and provide comprehensive redress to victims. Class action suits
in domestic courts can potentially play an important role in this
process. Yet, this brief survey of the advantages and challenges of
utilizing the class action mechanism in human rights litigation
reveals an uneasy fit.
For class actions to become an effective vehicle for human
rights litigation, it is necessary to overcome the challenges of obtaining certification. Likewise, litigants and courts must address
agency costs that diminish'the absentee class members' sense of
involvement in the process and result in disappointment and dissention within classes. In particular, lawyers and class representatives must take their fiduciary duties seriously, given the special vulnerabilities of human rights victims, the communication
difficulties with absentee class members, and the intensely personal nature of human rights abuses and claims. While courts
should be creative about how they conceptualize the commonality
and predominance elements of a class of human rights victims,
they should scrutinize and continually monitor the adequacy of
representation requirement of class certification to ensure that
class counsel and class representatives effectively implement
their fiduciary duties.
Although proceeding as a class may not result in perfect justice for victims of human rights violations, it may be better than
the alternative: an absence of justice for the victims of systematic
corporate conduct or derelictions of duty by commanders failing
to supervise their troops and incomplete accountability for responsible individuals and entities. Although human rights class
actions may be appropriate in these contexts, the individual action remains a vibrant method of obtaining justice for individual
victims with discrete claims who want to control the conduct of
the litigation.
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